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Abstract

This dissertation contains a series of essays that focus on corruption and its policy
implications.The study begins by providing an overview of corruption research and
the contribution of this study to the field. The first essay explores the relationship
between corruption and various forms of information and communication technologies
(ICT). The analysis suggests that internet awareness of corruption could potentially
act as a deterrent to corruption, however the impact of e-government may depend on
the quality of institutions.
The second essay uses data from the Afrobarometer survey to explore perceptions
of corruption across states in Nigeria. Using a mixed effects regression model, the
study finds perception of corruption to differ across gender, feelings of marginalization
and confidence levels in the Nigerian administration. Overall, people who were more
optimistic about Nigeria, were associated with less perceptions of corruption than
people who were more pessimistic about Nigeria as a democracy and as a fair country. This study suggests that attitudes impact survey based measures of corruption,
therefore using survey based measures as a proxy for actual corruption in relatively
ethnic diverse countries such as Nigeria may be misleading.
The third essay analyzes corruption among street level bureaucrats especially in
developing countries and helps provide insight into why corruption among street level
bureaucrats remains rampant in certain parts of the world despite a significant level
ii

of awareness and widespread attention to the problems that result from corrupt behavior. The analysis illustrates the role organizational culture, wage structure and
inefficient institutions has played in creating a culture of acceptance of corrupt behavior. This study recommends that increased monitoring of street level bureaucrats
and addressing the culture, wage structure and organizational recruiting processes is
necessary in order to tackle the issue of corruption specifically.
The study concludes by providing a summary and a general discussion of the
findings and the policy implications for policymakers. This study also suggests further
avenues for corruption research.
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Introduction

Corruption is seen as a major obstacle to international development goals. International organizations such as the United Nations have placed special emphasis on
anti-corruption efforts (Olken and Pande, 2012). In countries around the world, task
forces have been set up specifically to detect, investigate and persecute cases of fraud
and corruption in countries.
Given this, why is corruption deemed an important policy issue for governments
and Non Government Organizations (NGOs)? One reason lies in the definition of
corruption as used in a majority of research on this issue. Corruption is normally
defined as the abuse or misuse of public power for private or personal gain (Svensson,
2005). Thus, for a government employee to engage in corruption, it may signal
that resources allocated to government objectives are being diverted for personal
use. This could potentially have economic implications, as various corruption scandals
usually involve government officials embezzling a large amount of funds collected from
government budgets. An example, would be the case of a high ranking bureaucrat
embezzling millions of dollars, such as the case in Nigeria, where a former inspector
of general of police was convicted of embezzling $150 million US.1 If such funds were
intended for certain policy areas such as health care or education, ability of these
resources to meet the policy goals are compromised. Thus, not only are taxpayers
1

As stated in the BBC, November, 22, 2005 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4460740.stm).
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monies misused, there is also a cost related to the foregone benefits that would have
been accrued if the funds were used as originally intended.
This example illustrates some of the tradeoffs and problems a country may face
when faced with corruption. A major negative of corruption is the negative impact
this activity has on the economy. The rationale here is that if government funds
intended for economic development or human development policies are embezzled or
laundered into private accounts, it therefore follows that potential for broader economic growth is constrained. Thus, even in countries associated with higher economic
growth, the prevalence of corruption may mean the country is not realizing its full
economic potential. Another way corruption could potentially affect economic development is the loss of investments due to corruption (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1993).
As one example, De Soto (2000) found that in many countries the steps taken to
open a simple home business can take multiple years due to the amount of bureaucratic steps needed for approval. This leaves potential businesses with several options.
They can attempt to follow procedures, which may mean years of not generating any
income from their businesses or they can pay bribes to expedite the process. The
bribes result in an additional upfront cost consideration and as substantive resources
must be allocated to acquire the permits and licenses necessary for firm operation
(Murphy et al. 1993). It is also true these firms could operate in the informal economy, but this limits expansion opportunities as investment tends to increase when
there is a formal ownership of property, resources and business (Field, 2005; Frye,
2006). Finally, an individual can decide not to enter the industry, which creates an
opportunity cost in foregone earnings. Research has also found that the type of business being created in regions with high corruption may be more short term oriented
and engage in inefficient forms of production where entrepreneurs can easily shut
2

down and exit (Choi and Thum, 2004; Svensson, 2003).
Embezzlement is another example that illustrates the potential consequences of
corruption. Embezzlement at its core compromises human development goals. If
funds allocated to education, health, police or national security are embezzled, it
leads to fewer resources allocated to these services and less than adequate delivery of
essential services is likely the result.
Another potential problem with corruption is the effect on income inequality.
Gyimah-Brempong, 2002 and Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 2002 suggest that
high corruption is associated with high income inequality. A possible explanation may
be that corruption affects the poor disproportionately more than the rich (GyimahBrempong, 2002). This argument proposes that lower income individuals feel the
burden of corruption more than higher income individuals if social programs are
generally targeted to benefit the poor and lower income households. Where this is
true, the inefficiency of these programs due to corruption could increase inequality
(Gupta et al., 2002). Another instance in which corruption could increase inequality
is the ability of the rich to manipulate corruption in their favor on issues such as tax
avoidance, or using bribes to their advantage (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002).
The potential literature and examples highlighted suggests that corruption is an
important policy issue and further, is an interdisciplinary issue that has been studied
across disciplines. In general, corruption studies can be classified as either focusing
on the micro or macro levels of corruption. Micro level measures of corruption involve capturing corruption within an organization or a government agency. These
studies usually attempt to understand corruption by observing corruption in a particular industry or location. For example, (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004) were able
to estimate the amount of education grants that were actually received by public
schools in Uganda, discovering that a large portion of the grants were captured by
3

local government officials and politicians.
Macro studies aim at capturing corruption levels across a nation. This is usually
done through survey based measures. While Macro measures provide a means of
comparison across countries, these survey instruments in general do not measure the
magnitude of corruption. There are a few surveys who have asked about individuals
experiences with bribes so there are a few examples where there is an effort to understand the magnitude of corruption (Olken and Pande, 2012). In addition, perception
based measures are prone to bias where individuals may overestimate or underestimate corruption levels (Olken, 2009). The strengths and weaknesses of these types
of tools and measures will be discussed later in this research.
Other studies focus on developing theories explaining corrupt behavior. These
studies look at individual characteristics, institutions, economic policies and incentives as well as cultural variables. Some of these studies make use of macro level
data such as GDP and corruption indices, while others focus more on laboratory and
field experiments to observe individual behavior in relation to corruption. Due to the
interdisciplinary nature of corruption research, theories explaining corruption can be
categorized according to the area of emphasis.
Economic theories of corruption suggest that corruption behavior can be explained
by the economic gains to be made by engaging in corruption. Thus, a government
official will engage in corruption if the perceived gains outweigh any costs involved in
corruption after factoring in the probabilities of getting caught. Various research has
documented an inverse relationship between corruption levels and income, whereby
countries with lower GDP per capita are associated with higher levels of corruption
(Serra, 2006; Treisman, 2007; Svensson, 2005). A common belief in the literature
is that the causal mechanism moves in both directions, which is corruption impacts
the level or persistence of corruption in a nation, while lower economic performance
4

provides incentives for corruption (Olken and Pande, 2012).
The role of institutions and governance is another potential avenue for explaining
corruption. This area of research encompasses the ability of governments to monitor,
detect and punish corruption; the ability of the state to support economic growth;
as well as the democratic characteristics of a country. Countries with higher levels
of democracy and governance have been associated with lower levels of corruption
(Serra, 2006). There has also been research on the impact of colonial history, with
Treisman, 2000 finding that countries colonized by the British tend to be associated
with less corruption than other European colonies. This is argued to be associated
with, in part the legal institutions and infrastructure of the colonizing nation.
Other theories make use of the social and cultural characteristics of individuals
or countries and study their relationship or association with corruption. This area of
research suggests that differences in cultural attitudes such as collectivism or individualism may affect corruption. For example various studies have shown that collectivism is associated with higher levels of corruption (Bukuluki et al., 2013, Getz and
Volkema, 2001 and Mazar and Aggarwal, 2011). A possible explanation for this relationship is that government officials in collectivist societies may feel obliged to favor
their group or constituents that elected or helped them get to their current positions.
Gender has also been suggested to have a significant association with corruption with
research finding masculinity to be associated with higher levels of corruption (Dollar,
Fisman, and Gatti, 2001; Husted, 1999).
Another major field in corruption research deals with finding possible solutions
to corruption. This line of research usually involves case studies, lab and field experiments or cross country analysis. Some field experiments include the research by
Reinikka and Svensson (2005), which highlighted the results of a Ugandan media
campaign that provided budget information to the public and subsequently resulted
5

in fewer missing funds. Olken (2007) showed the impact of different forms of monitoring on corrupt behavior in Indonesia in a series of randomized experiments suggesting
the value of traditional top down monitoring in anti-corruption campaigns.
This dissertation contributes to the field of corruption by providing more depth
to corruption research. Specifically, this dissertation delves deeper into the role of
institutions as they relate to corruption. In addition, this study explores the role of
telecommunications, the impact of tribal tensions, colonial history and organizational
culture on corruption. The series of essays draws insight from various disciplines,
therefore allowing for a wider perspective for policymakers in addressing issues regarding corruption. The structure of this dissertation is as follows, the first essay is
a cross country analysis focusing on the effects of Internet and communication technologies (ICTs) and e-government on corruption. The study finds ICTs as measured
by internet awareness to be associated with lower corruption levels, but does not find
e-government to be significant when certain measures of institutions were used. This
study suggests that the effect of e-government depends on the quality of institutions,
and also highlights the importance of information access.
The second essay, focuses on corruption perception in Nigeria and its relationship
with attitudes and government approval ratings. The study finds that people unhappy
with the political administration were more likely to view government agencies as
corrupt. This study suggests implications for survey based measures of corruption
and issues that may arise due to sampling.
The final essay focuses on corruption in bureaucracies and illustrates how history,
economic struggle, organizational culture, monitoring and institutions play a role
in enhancing corrupt behavior. The progression of the essays corresponds with a decrease in the scope from macro to micro, the first study compares corruption amongst
nations, the second study focuses on a nation and the states within the nation, while
6

the third study focuses on corruption within an organization. The final section of
this dissertation provides a summary of the research and general policy implications
as well as avenues for further research.

7
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Exploring the Role of ICTs for Anti-Corruption
Strategy: A Cross-Country Analysis

Abstract
This paper explores the link between Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) on corruption while accounting for economic and institutional variables. ICTs are split into internet use, e-government and an internet awareness
on corruption measure developed by Goel, Nelson, and Naretta (2012). The
results suggest that the link between e-government and corruption is mixed,
depending on what measures of institutional quality are included in the model.
This study also finds that internet awareness on corruption is associated with
reduce perceptions of corruption which is line with the findings by Goel et al.
(2012).
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1

Introduction
A common definition of corruption is the misuse of power for personal gain. Re-

search on corruption has found negative effects of corruption on a country’s economy.
Gyimah-Brempong (2002); Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002); and Li, Xu,
and Zou (2000) find that corruption may increase income inequality. Svensson (2005)
suggests that corruption may result in ineffective public service delivery and that corruption could negatively affect investment decisions. Svensson (2005) suggests that
anti-corruption efforts have had little effect on reducing corruption, with Singapore
and Hong Kong listed among the few nations to experience significant reduction in
corruption levels.
Partly in an effort to combat corruption, there has been a push for increasing egovernment services globally (Bhatnagar, 2003). E-government generally refers to the
use of information and communication technology (ICT) to simplify and automate
government processes. Based on this definition, e-government can be seen as a tool
to fight corruption as it aims to reduce the likelihood of interaction between an
individual and a corrupt government official. In addition, e-government also serves
as a means to increase transparency, as e-government allows for timely feedback and
transmission of information. This has been empirically tested using country data
with a corruption perception index as a measure of corruption and the e-government
index as a proxy for e-government use in a country. The results suggest an inverse
relationship between corruption and the e-government index, indicating that, as more
e-government procedures are implemented in a country, less corruption is observed
(Andersen, 2009; Shim and Eom, 2008).
Elbahnasawy (2014) estimated the relationship between corruption and e-government
over time while also accounting for internet use across countries finding both internet
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use and e-government to be significant and inversely related to corruption.
Another way ICTs can be used to fight corruption is through improving the flow of
information through social media and other outlets. Through the use of blogs, social
media and online media sources, cases or incidents of corruption can be revealed to
the public, thus creating heightened awareness.
Access to sources of media in many countries is restricted and as such, it is therefore reasonable to believe that print and broadcast media do not capture all instances
of corruption. In response, Goel et al. (2012) created a measure of internet awareness
for corruption by taking into account internet hits for corruption and bribery for a
specific country. The empirical study showed an inverse relationship between corruption and this measure, meaning that countries with higher internet hits on corruption
per capita, have on average, lower corruption, after accounting for other economic
and political variables.
Both e-government and internet awareness are products of ICTs, thus the goal
of this paper is to explore the relationship between these two variables on corruption after accounting for other explanatory variables. This paper contributes to the
literature on corruption by specifying the various forms of ICTs and their related
relationship with corruption. Previous studies focused on one aspect of ICT, usually
internet adoption or e-government.
ICT as used in this paper refers to the application of information and communications technology devices and services. In this paper, the focus is on ICTs as applied
to government use, including applications, websites, satellites, mobile devices and any
other hardware and software that fall under ICTs, and can be used to improve the
delivery of services.
This research begins with a review of the literature on corruption and how it is
measured. The second section focuses on the methodology and the data used for this
13

analysis. The third and fourth sections discuss the results of the analysis and policy
implications are discussed in section 5. The study concludes in section 6.

2

Review of Literature
Before the development of corruption based measures, such as the corruption in-

dicators developed by private risk-assessment firms and later used by Knack and
Keefer (1995); Mauro (1995), research on corruption was mostly theoretical in nature. Since this proliferation of corruption based measures, research on corruption
continues to expand. Studies of corruption tend to focus on measuring the effects of
corruption; evaluating anti-corruption policies and tools; exploring the determinants
of corruption; and measuring actual corruption. Evaluating anti-corruption strategies and understanding what determines corruption tend to be related, since if certain
factors are suggested to impact or are associated with high levels of corruption, then
anti-corruption efforts will be geared towards reducing those factors. These areas of
corruption research help inform policymakers in anti-corruption campaigns.
Links have been established between corruption and cultural, legal, political and
economic variables. Studies focusing on culture tend to focus on ethnic groups, norms
and religious influence. These studies try to examine if certain cultural traits or features of a population are predisposed to corruption. With regard to ethnic groups, it
has been suggested that in very ethnically diverse countries, corruption tends to be
higher due to issues of nepotism (Treisman, 2000; Glaeser and Saks, 2006) . Dincer
(2008) found that regions with higher ethnic and religious polarization were associated with higher corruption. Smith (2001) provides a case study suggesting that in
collectivist cultures, the dependence and loyalty to clans or family may provide an
incentive for nepotism in the form of political appointments and awarding of govern14

ment contracts.
Studies focusing on legal and colonial history suggest relationships between the
type of legal system in a country and how corrupt a country is. La Porta, Lopezde Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) found that countries colonized by the British
were less corrupt than countries colonized by the French. The results of the study can
be linked to the legal system found in France and Britain, as Treisman (2000) found
that common law countries were less corrupt on average than civil law countries.
Since France and most of its colonies are civil law countries while Britain and most of
its colonies were common law countries, the hypothesis follows that French colonies
would be more corrupt than British countries controlling for other variables. The
theory behind common law countries being less corrupt than civil law countries is
that common law relies mainly on case law, whereas civil law relies mainly on codified
statutes (Treisman, 2000). La Porta et al. (1999) suggests that common law developed
in England partly as a protection mechanism for property owners against regulatory
attempts by the sovereignty, while civil law was developed in part to closely align
with the objectives of the state and facilitate greater control.
Studies focusing on economic variables attempt to explore how economic measures
may affect corruption. The openness of an economy is one of those variables and refers
to the willingness of a country to open itself up to trade and foreign investments.
Ades and Di Tella (1999) suggests that a closed economy will encourage rent seeking
behavior and subsequent corruption. Another economic measure is how endowed a
country is in terms of its natural resources. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) suggests
that countries that are well endowed with natural resources such as oil, tend to be
more corrupt because of the rent seeking behavior it encourages. Other important
economic variables include gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation. Paldam
(2002), found GDP to be the most significant variable when understanding the causes
15

of corruption, with an increase in GDP associated with a decrease in corruption. In
addition, inflation was also found to affect corruption, but only in the short term.
The findings by Paldam (2002) of the relationship between GDP and corruption have
been confirmed with other findings, including but not limited to Treisman (2000) and
Serra (2006).
The final group of variables deal with the role of political institutions on corruption. These studies focus on systems of government as well as the composition of
the political cabinet. Chowdhury (2004) found a significant relationship between the
level of democracy and corruption, that the more democratic a country is, the less
corrupt they are likely to be. Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001) focus on the gender
distribution in political offices. They find that countries with more women in political
offices were less corrupt than countries with fewer women in political positions. The
authors suggest that this may be as a result of the different personal characteristics
of the genders. For example, it has been argued that women may be more focused on
compromise and finding common ground. In a study by Reiss and Mitra (1998), the
authors found that males were more likely to find unethical practices more acceptable
than females.
Studies have also focused on the role of centralization in corruption. Centralization
here refers to the organization structure where the key decisions are made at the top.
Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) found that decentralized countries combined with
a relatively free press tend to be less corrupt than countries that are centralized. The
authors suggest that freedom of press is critical because the press acts as a monitoring
agent, where a higher freedom of press may result in an increase in the perception of
higher risks of being caught, and subsequently lower corruption levels.
With regards to anti-corruption, Shim and Eom (2009) identify three main categories of anti-corruption strategies, which include administrative reform, law enforce16

ment, and social change.
Administrative reform strategies deal with improving institutions in order to make
them better equipped to curb corruption. These strategies include improving monitoring and transparency in the bureaucracy, and creating incentives to encourage
accountability. Law enforcement reform focuses on policies that aim to specify and
enforce the rules and regulations around corruption. Law enforcement reform creates
policies that impose penalties for people found guilty of corrupt practices. Bertot,
Jaeger, and Grimes (2010) discuss the relationship between administrative reform
and law enforcement, explaining that administrative reforms reduce the incentives
for corruption while law enforcement increase the expected punishments and losses
for engaging in corruption. The social change approach focuses on remedying corruption through changing certain aspects of culture or beliefs and by encouraging citizens
and constituents to take an active stance in fighting corruption.
ICTs are normally characterized as a part of the social change approach, however,
they can be also be a part of the administrate reform approach. Since e-government
aims at improving the efficiency of the government in providing essential services, it
therefore promotes accountability and transparency. Additionally, as e-government
automates processes, increased transparency and accountability is likely to follow if
implemented successfully. Thus, it is argued that ICTs through e-government can
perform an important role in administrative reform in the fight against corruption.
Other media information sources, like blogs, websites and social media can help raise
awareness for corruption. Anonymous websites can provide avenues for people to
list their encounters with corruption and online media sources can detail accounts of
corruption. These sources of information fit in well with the social capacity strategies
for anti-corruption. Thus, through the use of e-government, ICTs can help improve
administrative reform, and through creating awareness, ICTs can improve social ca17

pacity anti-corruption efforts.
The United Nations Public Administration Network (UNPAN) developed an EGovernment index to measure the degree of e-government use by the country’s public
sector. Studies using this index to measure the relationship between corruption have
been conducted. Andersen (2009) found an inverse relationship between corruption
(as measured by the Corruption Perception Index) and e-government, meaning that
more participation in e-government is associated with reduced levels of corruption.
Similar results were found after using instrumental variables in an attempt to show
causality (Shim and Eom, 2008). Elbahnasawy (2014) explored the role of internet
use alongside e-government in curbing corruption, and found both variables to be
statistically significant, with an inverse relationship with corruption.
There is also the belief that corruption awareness and information is important
to reducing the impact of corruption. With regards to corruption awareness, Goel
et al. (2012) developed a measure of corruption awareness based on internet hits for
corruption and bribery of a country. Using search engines sites, this research collects
all searches of corruption and bribery as it applies to a certain country. The index was
created by recording the number of hits on both Google and Yahoo search engines,
finding the average of the two search engine results, and then dividing the average by
the country’s population. The study finds an inverse relationship between corruption
and internet hits on corruption, whereby countries with higher corruption awareness
are associated with lower corruption levels. This does not bode well for countries
with highly restrictive internet access as it limits the ability for individuals residing
in those countries to share or find more information on corruption.
While the research stream on corruption is varied, there is still considerable room
to continue to explore key research questions around what drives corruption and
control variables used to explore these relationships. This paper builds on earlier
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studies, by including both internet hits on corruption, e-government and internet use,
as well as several governance measures to explore the relationship between ICTs and
corruption. The next section of the paper describes the model and data used for the
analysis.

3

Model and Data
This paper aims to explore the relationship between ICTs and corruption, con-

trolling for other political and economic factors. The policy implication of the study
focuses on how ICTs can be used as a tool to fight corruption.
The first variable of interest is e-government. E-government is believed to reduce
corruption, since the automation of government services reduces the interaction with
corrupt officials. Alternatively, e-government may increase corruption if the corrupt
officials are able to detect ways to manipulate the system.
Internet awareness on corruption as measured by internet searches for corruption
and bribery is seen as a measure of how informed people are of corruption issues or
incidents for a given country. The relationship between this measure and corruption
could go in different directions. Internet awareness could serve as a deterrent to
corruption if it increases the perceived risk of being caught. On the other hand,
more corruption may lead to increased online reports on corruption whereby the
high amount of internet mentions on corruption is simply of byproduct of too much
corruption. In this case, both internet awareness of corruption and corruption may
move in the same direction.
Internet use as measured by number of internet users per capita is included in the
model because countries with a higher population of internet users may be more likely
to implement e-government policies. The same logic applies for internet awareness,
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as countries with a low population of internet users may have low internet hits on
corruption per capita simply because they do not have means to share information.
If e-government is perceived to reduce corruption by improving government efficiency, accounting for other institutional qualities would be relevant for the model.
One of these measures is size of government. Guriev (2004) suggests that larger governments may have larger bureaucracies which may provide more of an avenue for
corruption to occur. However, larger governments may also provide better systems to
detect and enforce anti-corruption law, so it is also possible that larger governments
are associated with reduced corruption.
Capturing institutional quality can be difficult, as institutions encompass a multitude of concepts. For this reason, different measures of institutions and governance
have been used to evaluate the impact of democracy and institutions on corruption
(Goel et al., 2012; Bologna, 2014). This study follows suit and includes several measures of institutional quality.
The relationship between income and corruption is one that is robust across numerous studies (Treisman, 2000; Serra, 2006). Higher income and economic prosperity
are associated with lower levels of corruption. The intuition behind this is that richer
countries are associated with stronger institutional systems and legal infrastructure
which is argued to hinder and prevent corruption. In addition, areas with higher per
capita income are likely to have greater perceived risks associated with corruption
than areas with lower per capita income.
The dependent variable is corruption perception which serves as a proxy for corruption. While corruption perception does not measure actual corruption and only
measures perceptions and experiences, research by Barr and Serra (2010) suggests a
positive correlation between corruption indices and corrupt behavior across countries.
For more robust results, the control corruption index developed by Kaufmann, Kraay,
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Mastruzzi, et al. (2003) and available at the World Bank (Corruption W B), and the
corruption perception index constructed by Transparency International (Corruption T I)
were used. Each model was run twice, one with control of corruption as the dependent variable and another with the corruption perception index variable. Utilizing
these two different indices provides for a stronger confirmation of the potential relationship between the independent variables and corruption. The difference between
the measures has to do with the broader sources of information used by the control
of corruption index, as well as the statistical strategies used to construct each index
Svensson (2005).
The Transparency International corruption index is measured on a scale of 0 to
100, where 0 represents complete corruption and 100 represents zero corruption. For
this analysis, the index was recoded whereby lower scores indicate less corruption.
The control of corruption index measured by the World Bank is measured on
a scale of -2.5 to +2.5, where -2.5 signifies complete corruption and +2.5 indicates
a corruption free country. Like the previous index, this was recoded whereby -2.5
signifies a corruption free country and +2.5 indicates complete corruption.
Data on internet awareness on corruption was constructed using the strategy developed by Goel et al. (2012) and also employed by Bologna (2014). The number
of results after performing an internet search that included the name of country, the
words “corruption” and “bribery” were recorded on both Google and Yahoo search
engines. The average of the two for the corresponding country were then divided
by the population of the country. Goel et al. (2012) suggests that the data can be
time sensitive, for example, performing a search on corruption and bribery in Panama
during the “Panama Papers” scandal could lead to a larger than normal number of
hits for Panama. However, the authors found a correlation of 0.8 between searches
conducted a year apart. A potential problem with the data is that all other vari21

ables in the model are for the year 2016 whereas the internet awareness measure for
this study was constructed in July of 2017. For this reason, results without internet
awareness are also included for comparison.
As a measure of e-government, the United Nations e-government index was used.
The index is the result of a survey of all 193 United Nations Member states, and
takes into account the accessibility of national websites and the degree of use of egovernment services. The higher the index, the more e-government is utilized in the
country.
Data on internet use was collected from the World Bank. This measure takes into
account the number of internet users per 100 residents. Data from Gross Domestic
Product per capita (GDPpc) was also collected from the World Bank.
The size of government, measured by government expenditure as a percentage of
GDP, was obtained from the World Bank as well.
Measuring institutions is ambiguous at best, as it can encompass ideas like democracy, provision of social services and the ability to stimulate economic growth among
others. To account for this, multiple measures were used. The first measure is the
Rule of Law, which measures the ability of the government to enforce laws and protect its constituents, as well as the willingness of citizens to abide by these laws.
The second measure used is Government Effectiveness, which assesses the quality of
public services, the civil service, policies, credibility and government commitments.
Both measures were obtained from the World Bank government indicator database
and measured on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, with the higher value indicating stronger
governments.
The Economic Freedom Index, developed by the Heritage foundation, is another
index that is often used as a measure of institutional quality. It also focuses on a
government’s ability to protect economic and civil liberties of its constituents. The
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index is measured on a scale of 0 to 100 with higher values indicating more freedom.
Taken together, these three measures, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness and
Economic Freedom should provide a wider variety of tools that measure and assess
institutional quality.
Finally, higher freedom of press has been linked with less corruption because the
media is argued to help create awareness, so the Freedom House freedom of press
measure was added to the model (Treisman, 2007). This index is measured on a scale
of 0 to 100 with 100 indicating complete media freedom.
Based on this information, the linear model considered for this study is:
Corruptionij = α0 + β1 Awarenessi + β2 E Government + β3 Internet U sei + β4
GDP pci + β5 Government Sizei + β6 Institutionsik + β7 F reedom P ressi + i
i = 1,...,154
j = Corruption T I, Corruption W B
k = Government Ef f ectiveness, Rule of Law , EconomicF reedom
The model was estimated using a least squares regression approach. There are
various specifications for the model. A regression was run for each of three institutional measures. In addition, a model without internet awareness was included.
Finally, each specification had to be run twice for the two different measures of corruption (Transparency International’s Corruption perception index and World Bank’s
Control of corruption index). In total twelve different regressions were run.

4

Results
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model are provided in Table

1, while Table. 2 shows the correlation matrix among the variables used in the model.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables

Variable

Description

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Source

Corruption_TI

Corruption perception index. Values
range from 0-100 and rescaled where the
higher values represent higher corruption

57.051

19.437

Transparency
International

Corruption_WB

Control of corruption index. Values range
from -2.5 to +2.5 and rescaled where the
higher value represents higher corruption.

0.520

0.997

World Bank

Internet_Use

Internet use per 100 people

47.237

28.919

World Bank

E. Government.
Index

E-Government index. Values range from
0 to 1, with higher values indicating
higher e-government use

0.495

0.216

United Nations
Public
Administration
Network (UNPAN)

Awareness

Average number of internet search results
for “corruption” and “bribery” per
population.

0.387

1.0928

Google, Yahoo,
Population from
World Bank

GDPPC

GDP per capita; US $, measured in
thousands where $1 = $1000

12.911

18.134

World Bank

Freedom
of
Press

Level of freedom afforded to the media.
Values range from 0 to 100, and rescaled
where the lower value represents less
freedom

56.720

23.871

Freedom House

Government
Size

Government final expenditure as a
percentage of GDP

82.047

15.876

World Bank

Government
Effectiveness

Government effectiveness estimate.
Values range from -2.5 to 2.5, where
higher values indicate a more effective
government.

-0.0437

1.00734

World Bank

Rule_of_Law

Rule of Law estimate. Values range from
-2.5 to 2.5, where higher values indicate
better monitoring and rules enforcement.

-0.0592

0.991

World Bank

Economic
Freedom
Score

Economic Freedom Index. Values range
from 0 to 100, with higher values
indicating higher economic freedom.

61.091

10.949

Heritage
Foundation
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix for all Variables
Corrupt Corrupt Internet E. Aware GDP Free Govt Govt Rule
TI
WB
Use
Gov
PC Press Size Effecti
of
Index
ve
Law
Corrupt
TI
Corrupt
WB
Internet
Use
E. Gov
Index

1

Econ
Free

0.988

-0.781

-0.764 -0.272 -0.813 -0.704 0.436

-0.918

-0.962 -0.695

1

-0.773

-0.752 -0.263 -0.834 -0.673 0.427

-0.915

-0.963 -0.690

0.931

1

1

0192

0.742

0.512 -0.513

0.884

0.814

0.651

0.0603 0.701

0.499 -0.507

0.884

0.807

0.640

0.327 0.0086 0.141

0.242

0.169

0.545 -0.494

Aware

1

GDPPC

0.152
1

Free
Press

1

Govt
Size
Govt
Effective

0.802

0.821

0.595

-0.197

0.627

0.703

0.507

1

-0.557

-0.477 -0.434

1

Rule of
Law
Econ
Free

0.949

-0.721

1

0.720
1

In the correlation matrix, the World Bank’s Control of Corruption and the Transparency International Corruption Perception index are highly correlated at 0.988.
This suggests that the results using either model should be similar to the other. Second, there is a high correlation between internet use and e-government at 0.931, which
should be expected as countries with a high e-government index are likely to have a
relatively high amount of internet users. .
The results in Table 3 represent three specifications of the model using the corruption perception index as the dependent variable but a different measure for institutional quality. Table 4 includes the same specifications used in Table 3 but without
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the awareness measure. The results in Table 5 represent three specifications of the
model using the control of corruption perceptions index as the dependent variable
but a different measure for institutional quality, while Table 6 includes the same
specifications used in Table 5 but without the awareness measure.
Internet awareness on corruption is statistically significant at the five percent level
in five of the six specifications. When the dependent variable is the control of corruption index and the institutional measure is economic freedom, internet awareness
on corruption is significant at the ten percent level.
E-government on the other hand was statistically significant (10 percent or lower)
when economic freedom was used as the measure of institutional quality. This is a deviation from previous studies linking e-government to reduced corruption. Potential
reasons for the disparity may be due to the addition of some institutional variables
not commonly used in corruption research. Institutional measures such as the rule
of law and government effectiveness also serve as measures of a government’s ability to deliver services in a fair and transparent environment. Since e-government is
implemented as a way to improve government effectiveness, the results suggest in an
already strong and effective government, e-government does have a significant relationship with corruption, while the true potential of e-government may not be realized
in a weak government. One other interpretation of the regression results is that the
relationship between e-government and corruption is indirect and depends on the relationship between e-government and institutions. This means that by including other
measures of institutions the true effect of e-government may not be observed. To
test the relationship between e-government and institutional quality, an interaction
between e-government and institutional quality was added to the models. The coefficient of this interaction was significant when government effectiveness and economic
freedom were used as institutional quality measures, and had a negative relationship
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with corruption, whereby an increase in institutional quality and e-government were
associated with a reduction in corruption levels.
On the other hand, even with freedom of press included and statistically significant, internet hits on corruption is statistically significant in most of the results. This
further confirms the idea that monitoring and access to information about corruption
can be a deterrent for corrupt activities.
Other findings are similar to the current literature in which higher income nations
were associated with lower corruption than poorer nations. In addition stronger institutions were associated with lower corruption. A larger government was associated
with lower corruption except when the rule of law was included in the model, in which
case there was no statistical significance.
The results were basically unchanged when internet hits was not included in the
model.
The results reveal that ICTs and specifically e-government services may impact
corruption but this research illustrates that the relationship is not clear cut and
depends on other, related variables, like institutional quality. Confirmation on the
significance of the internet searches for corruption verifies the importance of information, awareness and ideas of transparency.
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Table 3: Relationship between Corruption Perception Index, internet awareness and
e-government using various institutional measures.
Dependent variable:
Corruption TI
(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.011
(0.048)

0.050
(0.057)

−0.041
(0.076)

Awareness

−3.077∗∗∗
(1.009)

−5.057∗∗∗
(1.168)

−5.232∗∗
(2.249)

Rule of Law

−15.670∗∗∗
(2.191)

Internet Use

−11.692∗∗∗
(2.373)

Government Effectiveness

Economic.Freedom.Score

0.315
(0.257)

Government Size

−0.018
(0.036)

−0.052
(0.044)

0.023
(0.056)

GDPPC

−0.068
(0.057)

−0.100
(0.066)

−0.297∗∗∗
(0.075)

Freedom of Press

−0.028
(0.029)

−0.108∗∗∗
(0.032)

−0.226∗∗∗
(0.042)

E.Government.Index

0.473
(6.020)

3.595
(7.153)

45.492
(27.539)

Rule of Law:E.Government.Index

−2.839
(3.104)
−10.055∗∗∗
(3.456)

Government Effectiveness:E.Government.Index

−1.110∗∗
(0.432)

Economic.Freedom.Score:E.Government.Index

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note: Variable coefficients are presented with their standard errors below in parenthesis.
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61.327∗∗∗
(3.937)

66.753∗∗∗
(4.478)

68.157∗∗∗
(16.499)

135
0.934
0.930
5.054 (df = 126)
223.828∗∗∗ (df = 8; 126)

135
0.911
0.905
5.877 (df = 126)
161.479∗∗∗ (df = 8; 126)

131
0.834
0.823
7.910 (df = 122)
76.458∗∗∗ (df = 8; 122)

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 4: Relationship between Corruption Perception Index and e-government using
various institutional measures.
Dependent variable:
Corruption TI
(1)

(2)

(3)

Internet Use

−0.043
(0.048)

−0.013
(0.058)

−0.099
(0.073)

Rule of Law

−17.257∗∗∗
(2.197)
−13.093∗∗∗
(2.510)

Government Effectiveness

Economic.Freedom.Score

0.225
(0.258)

Government Size

−0.038
(0.037)

−0.081∗
(0.046)

0.010
(0.057)

GDPPC

−0.085
(0.059)

−0.137∗
(0.070)

−0.302∗∗∗
(0.077)

Freedom of Press

−0.047
(0.029)

−0.147∗∗∗
(0.033)

−0.253∗∗∗
(0.041)

E.Government.Index

6.275
(5.895)

12.017
(7.348)

44.739
(28.026)

Rule of Law:E.Government.Index

−0.379
(3.094)
−6.514∗
(3.585)

Government Effectiveness:E.Government.Index

−0.965∗∗
(0.435)

Economic.Freedom.Score:E.Government.Index

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note: Variable coefficients are presented with their standard errors below in parenthesis.
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61.921∗∗∗
(4.059)

68.970∗∗∗
(4.749)

73.959∗∗∗
(16.600)

135
0.929
0.926
5.217 (df = 127)
238.864∗∗∗ (df = 7; 127)

135
0.898
0.892
6.273 (df = 127)
159.588∗∗∗ (df = 7; 127)

131
0.826
0.816
8.051 (df = 123)
83.607∗∗∗ (df = 7; 123)

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 5: Relationship between Control of Corruption, internet awareness and egovernment using various institutional measures.
Dependent variable:
Corruption WB
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.0004
(0.002)

0.004
(0.003)

−0.001
(0.004)

Awareness

−0.107∗∗
(0.049)

−0.219∗∗∗
(0.059)

−0.251∗∗
(0.119)

Rule of Law

−0.919∗∗∗
(0.108)

Internet Use

−0.702∗∗∗
(0.121)

Government Effectiveness

Economic.Freedom.Score

0.009
(0.013)
−0.003∗
(0.002)

−0.005∗∗
(0.002)

−0.001
(0.003)

−0.008∗∗∗
(0.003)

−0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)

−0.020∗∗∗
(0.004)

Freedom of Press

0.001
(0.001)

−0.003∗∗
(0.002)

−0.010∗∗∗
(0.002)

E.Government.Index

0.188
(0.298)

0.360
(0.366)

1.812
(1.439)

Rule of Law:E.Government.Index

−0.037
(0.154)

Government Size

GDPPC

−0.426∗∗
(0.177)

Government Effectiveness:E.Government.Index

−0.048∗∗
(0.023)

Economic.Freedom.Score:E.Government.Index

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note: Variable coefficients are presented with their standard errors below in parenthesis.
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0.758∗∗∗
(0.196)

1.052∗∗∗
(0.229)

1.617∗
(0.853)

138
0.938
0.934
0.253 (df = 129)
245.024∗∗∗ (df = 8; 129)

138
0.912
0.906
0.303 (df = 129)
166.306∗∗∗ (df = 8; 129)

133
0.827
0.815
0.420 (df = 124)
73.843∗∗∗ (df = 8; 124)

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Table 6: Relationship between Control of Corruption, and e-government using various
institutional measures.
Dependent variable:
Corruption WB
(1)

(2)

(3)

Internet Use

−0.001
(0.002)

0.0004
(0.003)

−0.004
(0.004)

Rule of Law

−0.973∗∗∗
(0.106)
−0.757∗∗∗
(0.125)

Government Effectiveness

Economic.Freedom.Score

0.005
(0.013)

Government Size

−0.004∗∗
(0.002)

−0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)

−0.002
(0.003)

GDPPC

−0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)

−0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)

−0.021∗∗∗
(0.004)

Freedom of Press

0.0001
(0.001)

−0.005∗∗∗
(0.002)

−0.011∗∗∗
(0.002)

E.Government.Index

0.422
(0.282)

0.775∗∗
(0.365)

1.818
(1.459)

Rule of Law:E.Government.Index

0.048
(0.151)
−0.270
(0.180)

Government Effectiveness:E.Government.Index

−0.042∗
(0.023)

Economic.Freedom.Score:E.Government.Index

Constant

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note: Variable coefficients are presented with their standard errors below in parenthesis.
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0.772∗∗∗
(0.198)

1.140∗∗∗
(0.239)

1.865∗∗
(0.856)

138
0.936
0.933
0.257 (df = 130)
271.537∗∗∗ (df = 7; 130)

138
0.902
0.897
0.317 (df = 130)
171.030∗∗∗ (df = 7; 130)

133
0.820
0.810
0.425 (df = 125)
81.487∗∗∗ (df = 7; 125)

∗

p<0.1;

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

’

5

Policy Significance
Some of the results of the study confirm earlier research on corruption. This

research also finds that richer countries are associated with lower levels of corruption.
Additionally, this analysis reveals that freedom of the press is critical and countries
with little media freedom are associated with higher levels of corruption.
The role of ICTs is one that requires further examination. This study confirms
the findings of Goel et al. (2012) and Bologna (2014) that increase internet hits
on corruption and bribery per capita are associated with lower levels of corruption
as measured by corruption perception. As noted earlier, this can be a deterrent
to corruption when online articles, reports and even videos are uploaded detailing
corruption. These acts therefore increase the risk of exposure for corrupt officials
and may curb their incentive to engage in corruption. In addition, internet hits on
corruption serve as proxy for how informed people are about corruption. Future
research focused on specific countries or groups of countries, using these types of
internet information search variables, may shed more light on the role of information
and corruption in specific environments and cultures.
This research highlights several important considerations for challenging corruption. The first area of significance is for policymakers to promote freedom of information for all of its citizens. This means allowing private individuals to record, write
and share information of corrupt behavior without having the fear of persecution.
Similarly, this freedom must extend to the ability of private citizens to use the search
engines if they wish to use without fear of being blocked from a particular area on
the internet or being tracked by government sources.
Another key finding is that when other governance measures are included, the
effect of e-government is not statistically significant even at the 10 percent level in
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most of models. This suggests that e-government may not be able to mask the
problems with a weak government. It may also suggest that in weak governments
that lack efficient monitoring and enforcements, corrupt officials are more likely to
maneuver around e-government processes than in stronger governments. Essentially,
if e-government is implemented in governments or agencies lacking the capacity to
effectively monitor, the e-government may be doomed from the start; as without
inspections or transparency checks, e-government can be implemented in a way that
benefit officials.
Overall, these results provide opportunities for additional qualitative and quantitative research on corruption at different geographic and time scales. Focusing
additional efforts on refining variables related to ICTs and their relationship with
other independent variables is an important next step.

6

Conclusion
This analysis suggests that estimating the impact of e-government on corruption is

very sensitive to the institutional measures used. Previous studies found e-government
to be a useful tool in fighting corruption. This paper on the other hand suggests
that with the inclusion of measures such as internet use, government size and media
freedom the results for e-government are more mixed.
The results do confirm previous studies linking greater media freedom to reduced
corruption suggesting that monitoring and creating awareness is critical to corruption.
Affording local media greater freedom and protection and promoting online reporting
of corruption are critical recommendations to any government or public policymaker
in the effort to fight corruption.
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Do Attitudes Affect Perceptions of Corruption? Evidence from
Nigeria
Abstract
This study uses data from the Afrobarometer survey to explore perceptions of corruption
across states in Nigeria. Using a mixed effects regression model, the study finds perception
of corruption to differ across gender, feelings of marginalization and confidence levels in
the Nigerian administration. Overall, people who were more optimistic about Nigeria, were
associated with less perceptions of corruption than people who were more pessimistic about
Nigeria as a democracy and as a fair country. This study suggests that attitudes impact
survey based measures of corruption, therefore using survey based measures as a proxy for
actual corruption in relatively ethnic diverse countries such as Nigeria may be misleading.
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Introduction
After decades of research, corruption remains a critical issue on the policy agendas
of many African countries. According to most measures of corruption, African countries
tend to be among the most corrupt.1 Corruption has been shown to be an obstacle to
economic growth and a contributor to income inequality. (Mauro, 1995; GyimahBrempong, 2002). As many African countries are characterized by high rates of poverty,
concerns over the use or misuse of public funds and resources allocated for poverty
alleviation is an ongoing challenge (Svensson, 2005).
Studies on corruption tend to involve comparisons of corruption from one country
to another, usually after controlling for various cultural, political and economic variables.
These studies while informative and important tend to overlook the heterogeneous natures
of many countries. Many African countries rank high on the cultural diversity and ethnic
fractionalization indices (Alesina, 2002 ; Fearon 2003). For many of these countries,
independence from earlier colonizers brought arbitrary national borders. Today, these
nations are a mix of many different tribes and ethnic groups. Nunn (2011) suggests that at
least some of the mistrust among groups is rooted in the slave trade, where one tribe would
sell members of another tribe into slavery. Nunn argues that this has led to group level
mistrust that is passed from one generation to the other. Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti
1

Based on the corruption index created by Transparency International and the Control of Corruption
Index created by the World Bank.
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(2013), found that during periods of increased violence and civil unrest, general trust levels
were reduced and an increased sense ethnic identity was observed. This suggests that during
political instability or economic hardship, ethnic identities become more important and
members of an ethnic group would rely on other members from their own group than
nonmembers.
Research by Nunn (2011) applied to corruption results in a key research question; is
mistrust and suspicion across ethnic groups related to perceptions of corruption among
other ethnic groups. That is, if certain ethnic groups have a general mistrust of other ethnic
groups, are they more likely to perceive members of the other ethnic groups as more
corrupt. Another application and implication of this research question may be that people
in public office may use their positions to help people of their own ethnic group as opposed
to all of their constituents (Smith, 2001). This research focus is a way that social and
cultural differences can be applied to the study of corruption. This also broadens our
understanding of corruption within countries and across groups within countries.
One way of exploring the relationship between cultural and social variables with
corruption is through a within-country study on corruption where data on corruption from
administrative divisions of a country are collected and analyzed to see if there are
significant differences between these divisions. Nigeria uses states as its administrative
divisions, and there are thirty-six states and a federal capital territory located at the
geographical center of the country. Thus, there are 37 administrative divisions in Nigeria.
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The states are closely aligned with major ethnic groups. For example, states on the western
region of Nigeria are predominantly comprised of members of the Yoruba ethnic group,
and states from the north are comprised of predominantly Kanuri, Hausa and Fulani ethnic
groups. The study aims to answer the question as to whether perceptions of corruption
differ across political, cultural and socioeconomic actors. In a broader sense, the results of
this study could inform us as to whether feelings of national versus ethnic identity are
related to perceptions of corruption.
The idea of within-country corruption has been explored, Glaeser (2006) used
United States data of federal convictions on bribery and corruption by state to examine the
relationship. The study found that richer and more educated states were associated with less
corruptions. In addition, Ferraz and Finan (2011) constructed a measure of corruption for
municipalities in Brazil based on audit reports. In their study, the authors found that
municipalities where the mayor had a chance of reelection were less corrupt than
municipalities where the mayors were not up for reelection. The municipality measure of
corruption has been adapted in various research papers focusing on corruption in Brazil.
For instance, Bologna and Ross (2015), find that municipalities with increased corruption
were associated with a reduction of businesses operating in those municipalities.
Datasets, like the ones described above, for Sub-Saharan African countries are
unavailable. However surveys in Africa where individuals are asked about their experiences
with corruption do exist. It is through these kinds of surveys that the widely used measures
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of corruption such as the corruption perception index by Transparency International and the
Control of Corruption index developed by the World Bank are constructed. These measures
do not measure actual corruption but rather perceptions of corruption. Despite the fact that
they are perception based, these measures are informative as they provide an account of an
individual’s experiences with corruption. While these measures have been shown to be
correlated with corrupt behavior (Fisman and Miguel, 2007 ; Berra and Serra, 2010), they
can also be prone to bias and over or under-estimation of actual corruption (Olken, 2009).
This study seeks to explore whether perceptions of corruption differ across states in
Nigeria. This study contributes to the current literature of corruption in numerous ways.
First, there are not many studies on corruption that look at corruption within a single
country. Secondly, since Nigeria is regarded as one of the most corrupt countries in the
world, this study will help provide additional detail and insight. Finally, this paper makes
use of the Afrobarometer survey, with over 2400 respondents from Nigeria alone. This
dataset explores corruption on different dimensions from corruption of elected officials to
police corruption. Thus, this study provides an opportunity to examine how economic,
cultural and social variables such as ethnic identity and resentment affect perceptions of
corruption.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The first section focuses on the
relationship between perception of corruption and actual corruption. The second section
provides a review of the some of the determinants of corruption. The third section
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describes the data and model to be used in this study and the fourth section presents the
result of the analysis. Finally a discussion of policy implications and areas of future
research are explored.
Corruption and Perception of Corruption
Total corruption in a given region is difficult to measure due to the ambiguity of
corruption and measurement challenges. One can measure corruption in a specific situation
such as in trade ports (Sequeira and Djankov, 2014), or corrupt behavior through
experiments (Barr and Serra, 2010), but these measures only measure corruption on a
micro level. These types of micro-level corruption studies are important but are unable to
be used for macro corruption studies as they do not allow for generalizable statements
about corruption in a country. Even countries with documentation of corruption and bribery
convictions are not perfect because many cases of corruption and bribery will go
undetected and even where there are criminal cases they may not result in a “fair” judicial
process or cases may be thrown out . These challenges highlight, in part, why corruption
perception measures continue to be used in national and international corruption research.
By asking individuals about their experiences with corruption, responses capture trends and
patterns of corruption within a country. In addition, asking similar questions to people from
all over the world helps create a uniform database in which comparisons between countries
can be made. This adds validity to corruption based measures, gives researchers data to
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explore, and the ability to to test theories of corruption and the effectiveness of anticorruption measures.
One of the main criticisms of these survey based corruption measures is that they
can be subject to underestimation and overestimation of corruption behavior in practice.
For example, Olken (2009) found that due to limited information on the part of general
public, they were more likely to underestimate corruption in government projects. In
addition, an issue of bias may affect the survey results. It is conceivable that frustrations
with the current political administration may influence survey responses negatively and in
cases where national pride and overall happiness is at a peak, survey responses to questions
on corruption may be more positive. This is to suggest that in surveys on national issues, it
is difficult for some individuals to answer questions independent of emotions and attitudes.
For this reason, international based corruption measures tend to include responses from
foreign experts, foreign businessmen and expatriates because it is believed that their views
will be less biased, providing an overall more balanced perspective. The challenge with this
approach is that the experience of local residents may be understated or unrepresented.
The Afrobarometer survey, which will be used for this analysis, groups respondents
according to the state or province in which they live and focuses solely on the residents
themselves. Using these data provides an opportunity to test the idea that perceptions of
corruption are influenced by regional attitudes and beliefs.
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Determinants of Corruption
In deciding additional explanatory variables to include in the model, it was
important to review the literature on corruption determinants. There is literature
documenting several primary categories of corruption indicators. The categories can largely
be grouped as economic, political and cultural factors.
Economic indicators are key variables considered in corruption research. The results
generally conclude that countries with relatively poor economic performance tend to be
more corrupt (Treisman, 2000; Serra, 2006). An argument for this is that is the poorer the
country the more incentive for individuals to engage in corrupt behavior. Additionally,
poorer people may be more willing to accept bribes than to reject or report incidents of
bribery attempts. Also, economic development is suggested to have a positive impact on
democracy, education, literacy which should increase awareness on corruption (Treisman,
2000). In addition to economic development, salaries of public officials have been shown to
be associated with reduced corruption in some studies (Di Tella and Schargrodsky ,2003;
Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), and not robust in others (Rauch and Evans, 2000
;Treisman, 2000). Ades and Di Tella (1999) found that countries with open economies on
average were less corrupt than countries with closed economies.
Political factors of corruption focus on issues such as whether a nation is more
democratically leaning, the level of freedom in a country and the effectiveness of the legal
system. Treisman (2000) and Serra (2006) found that lower levels of corruption are
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associated with countries with older democracies. Serra (2006) also found that countries
with high political instability are associated with higher rates of corruption. Studies have
also found a link between legal system and corruption with common law countries
associated with lower levels of corruption (Treisman, 2000).
Cultural factors of corruption focus on belief systems and shared attitudes. Collier
(2002) suggests that countries with lower social trust and countries with high levels of
collectivism tend to be associated with higher levels of corruption. The theory behind this
idea is that collectivist cultures may encourage the use of political power to help people in
their self-identified group at the expense of the country’s or other groups goals. This was
also suggested by Smith (2001), who suggested that some public officials in Nigeria favor
people from their family or close groups.
Regional demographics can play a role as well, especially with regards to corruption
perception. Attila, (2008) suggests that age and whether the respondent lives in an urban or
rural area can be factors. For age, younger people may be less aware of corruption than
older people. Location is also believed to influence corruption, in that larger cities with
large populations promote incentives to engage in corruption due to the anonymity of being
in a large city and increased economic opportunities. Gender can also play a role in
corruption. Dollar, Fisman and Gatti (2001) suggest that women are less likely to engage or
tolerate corrupt behavior. Their study found that parliaments with a higher composition of
women were less corrupt.
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The media is also another key component of corruption, with research suggesting
that countries with greater freedom of press tend to be less corrupt than those with a
restricted press. The argument is that with the greater levels of freedom, media agencies
may be able to report on corruption scandals, and individuals who experienced corruption
may be more willing to report events to the media (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). In addition
to the media in general, internet use has been suggested to be associated with less
corruption (Lio et al, 2011). The rationale here is that internet access and use are other
tools in monitoring and creating awareness, as well as making it easier to implement egovernment procedures.
These variables, economics, political, cultural, demographics and media are all
important to our understanding of corruption. These variables will all help guide the
proceeding analysis where potential determinants of corruption in Nigeria are analyzed.
Data description
The data used for this analysis was obtained from the sixth round of the
Afrobarometer survey conducted for 2016.2 The Afrobarometer survey are a series of
questions asked to citizens of countries across Africa. These questions cover a large range
of topics, from politics to religion. The survey also includes demographic information of
each respondent, such as age, ethnic group and employment information.
Nigeria was chosen as the sample nation due to its ethnic diversity and generally
high level of perceived corruption. Three states did not have any respondents, thus for the
2

Data can be found at www.afrobarometer.org
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analysis thirty-three states and the federal capital territory were included in the study,
making it thirty-four different regions, which provides the regional component to this
analysis. In terms of respondents by state, the lowest number of respondents were from the
Bayelsa state with 32 respondents, while the highest number was 184 respondents from
Lagos state. The average number of respondents per region was 70.588.
With corruption perception being the variable of interest, the respondents in the
survey were asked various questions related to corruption and bribery. Of these questions,
this research included seven of the questions considered the most relevant to this study.
Each of the questions about corruption had similar elements; the interviewee was asked to
estimate the number of people in a specific category that were involved in corruption. The
respondent was provided the following options:
“None”, “Some of them”, “Most of them” and “All of them”.
The categories that are relevant to this study include the following; 1) Government officials,
2) Members of the parliament, 3) Judges and Magistrates, 4) Local government councilors,
5) Police, 6) President and 7) Business executives.
Table.1 below shows the correlation matrix between the corruption variables.
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Table 1: Correlation with Corruption Variables.
President Parliament

Officials Local
Police Jud Business
Government
ges Executives

President

1

Parliament

0.588

1

Officials

0.498

0.651

1

Local
0.471
Government

0.561

0.606

1

Police

0.339

0.453

0.493

0.482

1

Judges

0.373

0.451

0.448

0.460

0.369

1

Business
Executives

0.316

0.365

0.353

0.414

0.309

0.44 1
8

The correlation matrix (Table 1) illustrates that respondents distinguished between
the difference forms of corruption. For example, the correlation between corruption of the
president and corruption of police is 0.339, highlighting a relatively high degree of
independence between these two forms of corruption. The strongest correlation was 0.651
between members of parliament and government officials, still revealing a degree of
independence. In other words, residents are able to separate corruption between different
branches of government or agencies, adding validity to choice of having different measures
of corruption.
The explanatory variables used in this analysis also come from the survey and the
choice of variables was guided by the literature on determinants of corruption, as well as
additional survey questions that could potentially impact the study, such as ethnic identity
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and feelings of marginalization. An explanation of all of the variables used in the analysis
are described in Table 2.
Table. 2: Description of Variables
Variable Name

Description

Age

Individuals aged 18 and above

Gender

Male = 0, Female = 1

Cash

How many times the respondent was without disposable
income in the past year: 0 = Never, 1 = Once or twice, 2 =
Several times, 3 = Many times, 4 = Always

Food

How many times the respondent was without food in the past
year: 0 = Never, 1 = Once or twice, 2 = Several Times,
3 = Many times 4= Always

Water

How many times the respondent was without clean water for
domestic use in the past year: 0 = Never, 1 = Once or twice,
2 = Several Times, 3 = Many times 4= Always

Health_care

How many times the respondent was without medicine or
medical treatment when needed in the past year: 0 = Never,
1 = Once or twice, 2 = Several Times, 3 = Many times 4=
Always

Poverty Incidence

(Food + Health_care + Cash + Water )/ 4).3

Urban_Rural

0 if respondent lives in a Rural area, 1 if lives in an Urban
area

3

Formula for poverty incidence was adapted from similar approach used in Attila (2008)
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Public Affairs

Interest in Public Affairs. 0 = if not at all interested,
1 = not very interested, 2 = somewhat interested, 3 = Very
interested

Democracy

Does respondent feel Nigeria is a democracy
0 = Not a Democracy; 1 = Democracy with major problems;
2 = Democracy with minor problems; 3 = Full Democracy:

Fairness

Is respondent’s ethnic group treated unfairly. 0=Never,
1=Sometimes, 2=Often, 3=Always,

Highest level of

0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling, 2=Some

Education: completed

primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Some
secondary school/ high school, 5=Secondary school
completed/high school completed, 6=Post-secondary
qualifications, 7=Some university, 8 = University graduate, 9
= Post graduate

Region:

List of states and capital territory

Empirical Strategy
The aim of this study is to explore significant factors related to perceptions of
corruption in Nigeria. This analysis made use of survey data where individuals from
different states in Nigeria answered the same questions over the same time range. The
dependent variable corruption perception (CP) was estimated using the equation
CPij = αi + βXij + ∏Yj + εij
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where i represents the individual and j represents the state of origin of the individual. X
represents a vector of variables that are believed to be related to corruption perception, Y
represents the random effects estimation for the 37 administrative divisions, and ε
represents unobservable factors that are related to corruption perception.
Survey respondents were asked to estimate the prevalence of different forms of
corruption. The relevant questions are included in the Appendix, and the responses to those
questions were used to construct the dependent variables. Seven dependent variables for
corruption perception were chosen including; corruption among members of parliament,
corruption among business executives, corruption among police officers, corruption among
judges and magistrates, corruption of the president and the presidential office, corruption
among local government councilors, and corruption among government officials. State
dummy variables were included in the model due to the possibility that the state of origin of
the respondent may affect their responses about corruption. The analysis was conducted
using a mixed effects regression model approach in which the effects of states was
randomized because it is believed that being from a different state may affect responses.
This model was run for each of the seven different measures of corruption discussed in the
appendix section, using the same explanatory variables described in Table 2.
Results
The results of the models are shown in Table 4 and Table 5 in the appendix. In all
the models, the perception of corruption was higher for men than it was for women. Dollar,
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Fisman and Gatti (2001) suggest that women are less corrupt than men. This may translate
into different perceptions of corruption whereby men may be more suspicious of corrupt
behavior than women, if men are more likely to be corrupt.
People who perceived Nigeria to be a functioning democracy perceived less
corruption than other categories in the survey in six of the models with the only exception
being the model for business corruption in which there was no significant difference of
perception between groups. This may suggest that people who have confidence in their
government and elected officials may perceive less corruption. The location of residents was
significant in all the models except police corruption, that is, people in urban areas
perceived there to be more corruption (corruption among judges, business executives, local
government, parliament, office of the president and government officials) than those in rural
areas, whereas there is no significant difference in the perceptions of police corruption
whether one resides in an urban or rural area. This is in line with the theory that corruption
occurs more in urban areas than in rural areas (Attila, 2008).
The poverty incidence measure which took into account an individual’s access to
food, water and health care, was only statistically significant in the model for judicial
corruption. This may suggest that in a country where the average GDP per capita is already
very low like Nigeria, income becomes less of a factor, since most of the residents face
economic hardship.
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In the models for corruption of local government officials, corruption in the
parliament and corruption of the president, people who identified only with their ethnic
group and not their nationality were more likely to perceive corruption to be higher than
other groups. This may provide some insight into the idea that people who identify only
with their ethnic group, my be suspicious of other groups and believe them to be corrupt.
In terms of fairness, people who felt that members of their ethnic group were
treated unfairly (respondents who answered always or often) were associated with higher
corruption perceptions than other groups in most of the models except business corruption
and corruption of government officials. People who were optimistic about the country, were
associated with reduced perceptions of corruption in the models predicting corruption of
the president, corruption in the parliament and corruption of business executives. The
impact of education is somewhat mixed. People with some post graduate education were
associated with less perceptions of corruption in the models predicting judiciary corruption,
corruption in the presidential office, and parliamentary corruption. However, various other
education levels were found to be statistically significant and associated with lower
corruption perception for police corruption and presidential corruption. This may be
suggest that highly educated people may be less likely to accuse people of corruption, until
further investigation, thus the lower perception levels.
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Conclusion
The study also highlights how attitudes can affect perceptions of corruption. A positive
outlook may make citizens undervalue particular problems and a pessimistic outlook may
overstate current problems. These results provide support for the importance of good
governance on corruption. People feeling marginalized or unhappy may be an indictment of
government performance in delivering services. While this study further highlights the need
for more objective measures of corruption or more details on experiences with corruption in
the surveys, it does highlight the role of ethnic group and attitudes towards corruption
perception.
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Appendix
Table. 3: Corruption Questions
Question

Response Options

How many people do you think are involved 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2
= Most of them, 3 = All of Them
in corruption: The President and Officials in
his office
How many people do you think are involved 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2
= Most of them, 3 = All of Them
in corruption: Members of Parliament
How many people do you think are involved 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2
= Most of them, 3 = All of Them
in corruption: Government Officials
How many people do you think are involved 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2
= Most of them, 3 = All of Them
in corruption: Local government councilors
How many people do you think are involved 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2
= Most of them, 3 = All of Them
in corruption: Police
How many people do you think are involved 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2
= Most of them, 3 = All of Them
in corruption: Judges and Magistrates

How many people do you think are involved 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2
= Most of them, 3 = All of Them
in corruption: Business Executives
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Mixed Model Output
Table. 4: Corruption of Presidents, Parliament, Government Officials and Local
Government
Dependent variable:
President

Parliament Officials

(1)

(2)

(3)

Local
Government
(4)

Age

-0.002
(0.002)

-0.001
(0.002)

-0.002
(0.002)

-0.0005
(0.002)

Gender (Female)

-0.076*
(0.042)

-0.110***
(0.039)

-0.095**
(0.038)

-0.099**
(0.040)

-0.178***

-0.078

-0.054

-0.076

(0.051)

(0.048)

(0.046)

(0.049)

Poverty Incidence

0.020
(0.023)

-0.008
(0.022)

-0.017
(0.021)

0.011
(0.022)

Urban Resident

0.090*
(0.047)

0.151***
(0.043)

0.075*
(0.042)

0.120***
(0.044)

-0.078

-0.112*

-0.030

0.039

(0.072)

(0.068)

(0.066)

(0.069)

-0.180**

-0.208***

-0.105

-0.031

(0.071)

(0.067)

(0.065)

(0.068)

-0.066
(0.075)

-0.112
(0.071)

-0.036
(0.069)

0.059
(0.072)

-0.009

-0.044

-0.060

(0.055)

(0.053)

(0.056)

Optimism: Going in the right
direction

Public Affairs: Not very
interested
Public Affairs: Somewhat
interested
Public Affairs: Very interested

Democracy: A democracy, with
0.005
major problems
(0.059)
60

Democracy: A democracy, but
with minor problems

-0.136**

-0.178***

-0.162*** -0.273***

(0.065)

(0.060)

(0.059)

Democracy: A full democracy

-0.347***
(0.086)

-0.232***
(0.081)

-0.222*** -0.212**
(0.078)
(0.083)

Treated Unfairly: Sometimes

0.027
(0.051)

-0.057
(0.048)

-0.036
(0.046)

-0.028
(0.049)

Treated Unfairly: Often

0.089
(0.061)

0.046
(0.057)

0.063
(0.056)

0.140**
(0.058)

Treated Unfairly: Always

-0.064
(0.073)

0.145**
(0.068)

0.042
(0.066)

0.009
(0.070)

Education: No formal schooling 0.016
(0.158)

0.048
(0.148)

0.312**
(0.143)

0.020
(0.149)

Education: Some primary
schooling

-0.078

-0.118

0.212

0.023

(0.160)

(0.150)

(0.144)

(0.151)

-0.155

-0.087

0.159

-0.056

(0.141)

(0.132)

(0.127)

(0.133)

-0.252*

-0.203

0.049

-0.096

(0.139)

(0.130)

(0.125)

(0.131)

-0.202

-0.156

0.143

-0.087

(0.132)

(0.124)

(0.119)

(0.125)

-0.345**
(0.167)

-0.116
(0.156)

0.107
(0.150)

0.012
(0.157)

-0.242*

-0.115

0.086

-0.134

(0.137)

(0.128)

(0.123)

(0.129)

Education: Primary school
completed
Education: Some secondary
school / high school
Education: Secondary school /
high school completed
Education: Some university
Education: Post-secondary
qualifications, other than
university
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(0.061)

Education: University completed -0.267*
(0.150)

-0.147
(0.141)

0.196
(0.135)

0.062
(0.142)

Education: Post-graduate

-0.820***
(0.295)

-0.461*
(0.276)

-0.035
(0.268)

-0.014
(0.291)

0.115

-0.044

-0.007

-0.052

(0.070)

(0.066)

(0.064)

(0.067)

0.033

-0.054

-0.039

(0.047)

(0.046)

(0.048)

0.127*

-0.046

-0.038

-0.006

(0.071)

(0.066)

(0.064)

(0.067)

0.376***

0.221**

0.031

0.252**

(0.105)

(0.098)

(0.096)

(0.100)

Constant

3.125***
(0.179)

3.192***
(0.167)

2.968***
(0.162)

2.961***
(0.170)

Observations

1,910

1,920

Log Likelihood

-2,512.897

Identity: I feel more (national
identity) than (ethnic group)

Identity: I feel equally (national
-0.005
identity) and (ethnic group)
(0.051)
Identity: I feel more (ethnic
group) than (national identity)
Identity: I feel only (ethnic
group)

Akaike Information Criterion
5,085.794
Bayesian Information Criterion 5,252.440
Note:

1,931
-2,397.408
2,363.450
4,854.817 4,786.900
5,021.619 4,953.873

1,915
-2,425.988
4,911.976
5,078.700

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table. 5: Corruption among Police, Business Executives and Judges
Dependent variable:
Police
(1)

Business Executives Judges
(2)
(3)

Age

-0.005**
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)

0.003*
(0.002)

Gender (Female)

-0.139***
(0.041)

-0.017
(0.042)

-0.051
(0.042)

0.038

-0.087*

0.036

(0.050)

(0.051)

(0.052)

Poverty Incidence

0.037
(0.023)

-0.011
(0.023)

-0.050**
(0.024)

Urban Resident

0.014
(0.045)

0.083*
(0.046)

0.089*
(0.047)

0.131*

0.008

0.059

(0.071)

(0.074)

(0.074)

0.046

-0.133*

-0.083

(0.070)

(0.073)

(0.073)

0.127*
(0.074)

-0.084
(0.076)

-0.020
(0.077)

0.003

-0.002

(0.059)

(0.060)

-0.253***

-0.092

-0.195***

(0.063)

(0.065)

(0.066)

-0.027

-0.008

-0.163*

Optimism: Going in the right
direction

Public Affairs: Not very
interested
Public Affairs: Somewhat
interested
Public Affairs: Very interested

Democracy: A democracy, with
-0.023
major problems
(0.057)
Democracy: A democracy, but
with minor problems
Democracy: A full democracy
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(0.084)

(0.086)

(0.088)

Treated Unfairly: Sometimes

-0.008
(0.050)

-0.009
(0.051)

-0.003
(0.052)

Treated Unfairly: Often

0.122**
(0.060)

0.117*
(0.062)

0.117*
(0.062)

Treated Unfairly: Always

0.150**
(0.071)

0.045
(0.073)

0.141*
(0.074)

Education: No formal schooling -0.160
(0.154)

0.117
(0.160)

-0.048
(0.159)

Education: Some primary
schooling

-0.166

0.160

0.081

(0.156)

(0.163)

(0.162)

-0.128

0.078

-0.005

(0.137)

(0.144)

(0.141)

-0.218

0.116

-0.117

(0.135)

(0.142)

(0.140)

-0.207

0.139

-0.075

(0.129)

(0.135)

(0.133)

-0.163
(0.162)

-0.094
(0.169)

0.018
(0.169)

-0.216

0.051

-0.091

(0.133)

(0.139)

(0.137)

Education: University completed -0.040
(0.146)

0.128
(0.153)

-0.114
(0.150)

Education: Post-graduate

-0.287
(0.297)

-0.690**
(0.298)

Education: Primary school
completed
Education: Some secondary
school / high school
Education: Secondary school /
high school completed
Education: Some university
Education: Post-secondary
qualifications, other than
university

-0.242
(0.290)
64

Identity: I feel more (national
identity) than (ethnic group)

-0.192***

0.049

-0.047

(0.069)

(0.071)

(0.072)

-0.153***

-0.002

(0.051)

(0.051)

-0.063

0.052

0.024

(0.070)

(0.071)

(0.073)

0.117

-0.092

0.090

(0.103)

(0.105)

(0.107)

Constant

3.389***
(0.173)

2.484***
(0.178)

2.568***
(0.181)

Observations

1,935

1,902

Log Likelihood

-2,512.956

-2,506.070

1,895
2,513.225
5,086.450
5,252.859

Identity: I feel equally (national
-0.050
identity) and (ethnic group)
(0.049)
Identity: I feel more (ethnic
group) than (national identity)
Identity: I feel only (ethnic
group)

Akaike Information Criterion
5,085.911
Bayesian Information Criterion. 5,252.947

5,072.139
5,238.659

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Developing a Framework for Corruption in Street
Level Bureaucracies

Abstract
This study analyzes corruption among street level bureaucrats especially in
developing countries. Street level bureaucrats as used in Lipsky (2010) to refer
to government employees or officials that are involved in direct interactions
with members of the general public. This study helps provide insight into why
corruption among street level bureaucrats remains rampant in certain parts of
the world despite a significant level of awareness and widespread attention to
the problems that result from corrupt behavior.
The analysis illustrates the role organizational culture, wage structure and
inefficient institutions has played in creating a culture of acceptance of corrupt
behavior. This study recommends that increased monitoring of street level bureaucrats and addressing the culture, wage structure and organizational recruiting processes is necessary in order to tackle the issue of corruption specifically.
Finally, this research generates a framework for understanding corruption at
the lower level of public agencies in general.

66

1

Introduction
Around the world various agencies and organizations have been developed to de-

tect cases of corruption and fraud. Many of the findings from these agencies showcase
how problematic corruption in government agencies can be for individuals and the
public at large. For example, In Nigeria, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), is a government agency set up to investigate and detect cases of
fraud and corruption. Since its origin in 2003, it has detected several embezzlement
cases involving millions of dollars US. This is important because embezzlement of
funds by government agents indicate that that budgetary funds are diverted into
private accounts and are therefore not used for their original intended purpose. An
diversion of public funds that could have been utilized to fund critical public services
like education, health care and other developmental goals will be compromised when
embezzlement occurs. This suggests that corruption is a serious issue and can impact larger national economic and community development objectives. Research has
shown a negative relationship between corruption and economic prosperity, whereby
more corrupt countries are associated with lower GDP per capita (Svensson, 2005 and
Treisman, 2000). For instance, many sub-Saharan African countries are associated
with high levels of corruption 1 , and many of these nations are also plagued with
low GDP per capita, high rates of poverty and other governance and institutional
challenges.
Corruption is usually defined as the misuse of political power for private gain
(Svensson, 2005). In terms of corruption across government officials, it can be further
broken down into corruption across different government agencies or branches. One
of the common forms of corruption in African countries is corruption by civil servants
1

According to the Transparency International Corruption Index and World Bank’s Control of
Corruption Index
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who come in contact with the general public. In 2015, Afrobarometer conducted
surveys including questions asking residents of various African countries to estimate
the amount of members within a public agency involved in corruption 2 .
Table 1 illustrates the aggregated results of this survey. Based on these results,
respondents across Africa found the police to be the most corrupt agency followed by
business executives and government officials. This does not suggest that the magnitude of corruption is higher with police, rather it more likely suggests that this is the
most visible form of corruption among the public agencies because people encounter
police on a regular basis going about their lives. The general idea of the police and
their interaction with average individuals can be applied to various street level bureaucrats in general. Street level bureaucrat is a term that refers to members of public
agencies that are in direct contact with the general public such as border agents, custom officers, license and permits issuers, inspectors and police officers (Lipsky, 2010).
In terms of the scope and breadth of corruption, understanding the nature of corruption at the level of the street level bureaucrat is critical if communities seek to find
solutions to this barrier to economic and community development.
2

The survey can be obtained at afrobarometer.org
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Table 1: Corruption perceptions in Africa

Li and Wu (2010) suggest that some forms of corruption are more harmful than
others. It can be argued that in some instances, corruption aids investment and
economic growth, whereby bribery can be used to expedite investment opportunities
(Svensson, 2005). This kind of corruption can be referred to as efficiency enhancing
corruption (Li and Wu, 2010). On the other hand, there are other forms of cor69

ruption that have overwhelming negative effects such as embezzlement. This form
of corruption can be termed as predatory corruption (Lipsky, 2010). The nature of
corruption among street level bureaucrats would suggest that both forms of corruption are present. For example, paying bribes to a bureaucrat at the permit office to
obtain the relevant licenses to operate can be seen as efficiency enhancing corruption,
while a traffic officer preventing a motorist from driving unless a bribe is paid, can
be seen as predatory corruption. However, even efficiency enhancing corruption can
have negative effects, as the bribes paid to do business could have been instead used
to increase production. In addition, paying bribes to do business may result in less efficient firms entering the market simply because they can afford to pay the bribes and
other firms not being able to enter the market because they could not afford to pay
the bribe. Thus, irrespective of what kind of corruption, the potential consequences
warrant further insight into corruption in these agencies.
The objective of this study is to gain stronger theoretical insight into corruption
among street level bureaucrats, and why it remains pervasive and endemic in some
nations. This study draws upon theories from organization culture and institutions to
develop a framework for street level bureaucratic corruption. An additional rationale
for this study is to suggest that corruption may be endemic to some organizations and
enacting different policies for punishment and prevention may not be enough until
the culture surrounding these institutions is addressed.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section provides a basic incentive
model for corruption which will guide the study, the second section provides an
overview of corruption among street level bureaucrats, while the third and fourth
sections focus on organizational culture and social norms respectively. Section five
models an interaction involving a corrupt bureaucrat and an individual and finally
the conclusion considers potential solutions to police corruption and opportunities for
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policy change respectively.

2

Model for Corruption
Olken and Pande (2012) provides a model for the decision making process for a

bureaucrat on whether or not to engage in corruption. This is shown below:

w-v<

1−p
(b
p

− d)

where w is the wage or compensation of the bureaucrat, v is the outside option if
fired, p is the probability of getting caught, b is the bribe received and d represents
the cost of being dishonest. Dishonesty costs refers the costs of engaging in dishonest
acts, such as guilt, shame, anxiety or paranoia. The dishonesty cost would vary from
person to person and people more comfortable with engaging in dishonest activity
would have lower dishonesty costs.
This model provides insight into corrupt behavior. First, wages of bureaucrats
can be a problem in many developing nations, in that a relatively low wage structure
can create incentives to engage in corruption. Secondly, the outside options if caught
can also affect incentives to engage in corruption. Outside options refer to the opportunities available for the bureaucrat if they lose their jobs as part of their punishment
for corruption. If the punishments are effective enough, then corrupt behavior can be
deterred as serving jail term for example, limits outside options. However, the fear
of punishment depends on the perceived probability of being caught. If a corrupt
official does not believe he will be caught then he is more likely to engage in corruption. Finally, there is a cost of being dishonest, but this cost varies from bureaucrat
to bureaucrat. If one bureaucrat has a high tolerance for dishonesty, for example, the
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bureaucrat may believe corrupt behavior is justified then he is more likely to engage in
corruption while someone with a lower tolerance for dishonesty or unethical behavior
is less likely to engage in corrupt practices.
The study illustrates the relationship between wage structure, dishonesty and the
probability of being caught and how it facilitates the preponderance of street level
bureaucracy corruption in developing countries. This study suggests that ineffective
or weak monitoring and weak wage structure(s) may be variables that contribute to
a culture of corruption in public organizations.

3

Street Level Bureaucracy and Corruption
Due to the nature of street level bureaucracy, individual citizens would be more

likely to observe corrupt actions by street level bureaucrats than other public sector
officials. This is not to say that they are the most corrupt sectors of government,
but they are the ones in contact with individuals, so individuals are likely to observe
the corrupt behavior of street level bureaucrats more so than that of a high ranking
government official. Additionally, in some nations corruption is perceived as so endemic that it is regarded as a way of life or as a means to get things done or enhance
productivity for an individual or family (Svensson, 2005). In addition, this study
suggests that corruption among street level bureaucrats is greater in positions where
the use of force and threats can be easily orchestrated. For example, a health code
inspector can threaten to shut down a restaurant if a bribe is not paid, or a customs
officer working at entry ports can deny imported goods entry into the country unless
a bribe is paid. In contrast, an elementary school teacher has less room or ability
to engage in corrupt behavior, even though this does not preclude it. Thus when
street level bureaucracy is described in the context of corruption as it pertains to this
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analysis, it refers to those positions where tactics such as threats, intimidation, or
denial of service can be orchestrated and can have a direct impact on the individual
or organization which the individual is associated.
A question one may ask is why do citizens not show much resistance or why do
offenders not get punished? This study suggests that many individuals in societies
where corruption is prevalent, do not show much resistance because corruption has
become a social norm in these societies and as such the costs of not engaging are
substantive.

4

Organizational Culture and Learning
This study defines Organization culture as the pattern of shared values, beliefs,

norms and patterns of behavior that are pertinent to an organization (Deshpandé,
Farley, and Webster Jr, 1993). Schein (2010) defines culture as those elements of
an organization that are the most stable and resistant to change. Therefore, for an
organization to have culture, it should have elements that have become endemic to
the organization.
If there is a culture of corruption within a public agency, then the agency would
be expected to have mechanisms that facilitate corrupt behavior, in a way that corruption has become endemic and is supported, such that even a significant portion of
new members are likely to engage in corrupt behavior. Saying that there is a culture
of corruption just because some members of an organization exhibit corrupt behavior
is not enough. But with a documented history of corruption in some of these organizations such as the mining industry or police forces in some countries, inferences can
be drawn about whether there is indeed a culture of corruption.
Schein (2010) attributes leadership as integral in the formation of organizational
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culture. This research explains that leaders are critical in the formation and maintenance of culture. In addition, leaders are responsible for maintaining culture when it
is tested by the external environment. One of the primary functions of the leader is
the responsibility for creating an environment and developing strategies that makes
the organization less susceptible to the external environment. External environment
in this case refers to the outside pressure that could be in the form of protests or
reports detailing corruption. These kinds of pressures could impair the ability of corrupt bureaucrats to engage in corrupt practices because of the increased awareness
and transparency they create. As such, applying the concept of leadership to corruption, one can see the role and incentives of leadership in maintaining corruption
despite heightened awareness and anti-corruption campaigns.
A specific example of police corruption illustrates this point. In nations where
individuals avoid certain roads if they feel they are likely to be harassed by corrupt
police officers, the leader is tasked with developing resistance to these kinds of outside
pressures. If police corruption is endemic due to culture, wage incentives and broad
social and organizational norms, it is imperative that the leadership maintain the
ability to extort and engage in other forms of corruption. Protecting this may take
different forms but the literature on leadership indicates that protecting organizations
from these outside pressures is a key role of the organization’s leadership. Explaining
how leadership creates a culture around managing external stimuli and pressures
involves a closer look at the process of organizational recruitment and duty assignment
in some of these organizations.
In terms of recruiting, it is conceivable that some individuals may self select into
public agencies in order to engage in corrupt practices. For example, some police
divisions in some countries are characterized by recruits having to pay bribes at
the time of application in order to get accepted (Human Rights Watch, 2010). This
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creates a situation whereby desirable characteristics such as integrity and high morals
are overlooked in favor of people who are willing to bribe their way into the force.
Corruption also plays a role in the delegation of duties. In some agencies, bribery
is used as a means to gain desirable job assignments (Human Rights Watch, 2010).
In addition in some organizations, street level bureaucrats are required to submit a
quota of bribery earnings to superiors and failure to do so may result in demotions
or reassignment (Human Rights Watch, 2010). If an organization is plagued with a
compromised recruiting process whereby some of the new recruits bribed their way
into the organization and the superiors demand bribes from subordinates, it suggests
that the leaders of these agencies have fostered a culture of corruption. If people
bribed their way into an organization, it follows that some of them would be more
eager to engage in corrupt behavior as members of the organization. Thus, the role
of leadership in fostering an ongoing culture of corruption is critical to understand
the persistent and pervasive nature of corruption.
Another part of culture has to do with learning. Organizational learning suggests
that certain elements of culture are learned and absorbed by members of the organization to ensure that culture is maintained. This is critical because for an organization
to have culture it requires that even when members leave and new members join,
those cultural attributes remain. In the case of corruption in public agencies, if the
same forms of corruption continue to occur despite old members leaving and new
members joining, this suggests that certain mechanisms are in place whereby corruption continues irrespective of personnel changes. Understanding these mechanisms
requires an understanding of the ongoing learning in organizations and how this may
impact culture.
Cook and Yanow (1993) suggest that culture can be learned by members of an
organization, whereby the exit and entry of members does not result in loss of iden75

tity. The authors use three flute making organizations located in Boston to illustrate
organizational learning. The flutes made by each company have distinct and identifiable characteristics, that experienced flute players can identify and so determine
which company made the flute. The characteristics have remained the same over
decades, despite staff turnover. Cook and Yanow (1993), suggest that new flute makers learn how to make flutes in the same style and manner of the company over time.
Thus, the integrity and ideals are maintained and eventually the new members become experienced. Additionally, individuals with organization knowledge and history
are responsible for integrating new flute makers. As a result, the flutes made by the
organization remain the same for decades, even as flute makers leave and new ones
arrive. Through this delicate process of teaching and guiding, the flutes maintain the
same design and build over many years.
The concept of organizational learning may offer insight into the culture specific
to corruption in organizations. Cook and Yanow (1993) mention that the interactions between apprentice and experienced flute makers facilitated learning and similar
comparison can be made with corruption in bureaucracies. New members may learn
from experienced members by simply observing them on duty. More importantly,
self-selection and coercion are means that facilitate learning in the bureaucracies,
whether this positive or negative. Self-selection refers to the idea that a fraction of
street level bureaucrats chose to join their organizations in order to extort and collect bribes. If these new member have a high tolerance for corrupt behavior, they
would be more eager to learn effective corruption strategies from superiors. Further,
coercion also comes into play due to the bribery quota that exists in some public
agencies as discussed earlier, whereby in some organizations failure to pay bribe(s) to
superiors may result in agency demotions.
In some cases, bureaucrats who strive to be diligent may feel powerless to make a
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difference, which may result in them leaving the agency or even engaging in corruption
themselves (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Specific to police officers, there is also a
mindset whereby their actions are justified due to what they see happening in other
public agencies and with other fellow officers (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Thus, in
some situations the culture of an organization can influence people of high integrity
to conform to corrupt behavior.
The importance of the interactions between moral street level bureaucrats and
corrupt ones could also be a factor in stimulating the learning process for corruption.
A moral bureaucrat may be persuaded to become corrupt if a case could be made
that not engaging in corruption may be financially difficult due to the relatively low
wages or other forms of coercion. A 2015 investigative article suggested that new
police recruits in Nigeria earned 9000 Naira a month (as noted by Isine Ibanga in the
Premium Times Nigeria, May 18, 2015). This equates to about $30 US monthly and
$360 annually. The position above the recruit is the constable, who earns a monthly
salary of about 43,000 Naira, which equates to about $130 US per month or $1560
annually. In contrast, the 2015 GDP per capita measured by purchasing parity for
Nigeria was $6,003.9, and $18,678.6 for people employed.3 This disparity suggests
that low ranked police officers are substantially underpaid given these comparisons.
In addition, since police officers in certain countries are already viewed with suspicion
and even contempt, moral corrupt officers may feel as though their efforts are in vain
and as a result join the corrupt officers and engage in corruption. For instance,
Tamuno (1970) as cited in Alemika (1988), suggests that the negative perception
of police officers may encourage police officers to shirk from their duties. Further,
in many developing countries the options for employment and other opportunities
are limited, bureaucrats of good morals may be pressured to conform. Through the
3

GDP information were taken from the World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria
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combination of coercion, self-selection and feelings of defeat, street level bureaucrats
may engage in corrupt behavior and as they advance in the organization, new recruits
may follow suit.
The idea that public perceptions may influence corruption can be seen as one
of the influences of the external environment on an organization. The external environment refers to the environment outside the organization. This could refer to
individuals or other organizations. Even though corruption is often viewed with disgust among citizens, it is also understood that it is a way of life. The result is that
even though that even though individuals feel corruption is bad and has negative
effects, citizens may also recognize it as a necessary evil to avoid negative financial
or physical consequences. That is, citizens view bribery as a necessary means to get
things done (Svensson, 2005). Therefore, if individuals encounter street level bureaucrats and expect to pay a bribe, the lack of resistance allows corrupt bureaucrats
to engage in corruption with wider latitude and potentially even more forcefully. In
addition, some individuals after committing punishable offenses such as illegal traffic
turns in the case of police corruption or smuggling of contrabands in the case of custom officers, on border patrol, may initiate bribery with the respective bureaucrats
to avoid punishment. Thus, the culture of corruption with street level bureaucrats is
facilitated by the external environment in the sense that the general public does not
show any significant or widespread resistance, and in some cases may encourage the
practice.
Figure 1 below, attempts to show the relationship between the external environment, and the internal environment (within the public agency) as they influence
corruption. The box represents the internal factors that influence corruption, while
the circles outside the box represent the external environment. To better understand
the influence of the external environment in facilitating police corruption, a discussion
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of social norms and institutions will be discussed in the following section.
Figure.1: External and internal factors influencing corruption among street level bureaucrats

5

Social Norms
Social norms as used in this study to refer to behaviors and actions that are

expected by members of a society. Once a social norm is widespread, it also assumes
that there is a penalty for deviating from these norms. A basic example of a social
norm is a practice such as the giving up of one’s seat on the bus for the elderly. In
this example, one may view social norms as behavior born out of kindness or high
character. However upon further analysis, it can be shown that these social norms
exist and continue to exist because there are penalties for deviating. If one does not
give up their seat for a disabled or elderly person, they may be shunned by others
or be on the receiving ends of insults. Giving up ones seat on the other hand, may
be rewarding due to the praise one receives, or the feeling of altruism. Thus, this
creates an incentive for people to carry out actions like these. This is not to say that
virtuosity is not important, but rather, members of a society become conditioned to
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act on these ideals that have been developed overtime because deviating from them
imposes higher social costs. Thus, moral virtues are not the only criteria for how
social norms are formed and perpetuated. In the end, social norms are at times
encouraged and facilitated by individuals good nature, however a case can also be
made that the costs of being seen as greedy or heartless may be a key motivator for
some individuals as well.
The evolution of social norms is shaped by the institutions of a society. Mantzavinos (2004) defines institutions as a set of rules that govern a society. These institutions
could be formal through the laws issued by the legislature, or the institutions could
be informal such as giving handshakes with the right hand in some cultures. In many
instances, informal institutions govern, in large part, how individuals behave in daily
life. This study suggests that paying bribes to street level bureaucrats in corruption
riddled countries has become a social norm and as a consequence, an informal institution. Mantzavinos (2004) also discusses the concept of social norms, explaining that
they evolve as solutions to social problems with conflicting interests. In some situations such as corruption, the formal institutions may not be effective in dealing with
the problem. In this case, individuals rely on informal institutions in order to arrive
at a solution, even if the solution has its own negative consequences. Many countries have laws against corruption and ay even outline punishments for bureaucrats
found guilty of corruption, but the application and practice of these laws and rules
is weak or nonexistent. As a result, citizens and residents in these countries continue
to find themselves defenseless against corruption, hence, the formal anti-corruption
institutions are not effective.
In these situations in societies, informal institutions are often employed to solve
these problems. In the economics literature the best outcome is the one that achieves
the highest net gain in which the benefits exceed the costs. Further, rational decision
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making assumes individuals weigh their individual costs and benefits to determine
their individual optimal choice. In regards to corruption among street level bureaucrats, when an individual becomes a target for extortion or corruption attempts, they
weigh the costs and benefits involved in yielding to corruption or attempting to resist
as opposed to looking at it from a purely social or ethical standpoint. If coercion
and intimidation are used by street level bureaucrats to extort bribes from people
and there is a lack of protection against corruption provided by law enforcement for
citizens, this combination creates a situation where the dominant strategy for most
individuals is to pay bribes to protect their own individual interests. Fo example,
if an individual is on her way to the airport and gets stopped on her commute, she
would be more willing to pay a bribe irrespective of whether she did anything wrong
or not. If a restaurateur is harassed by the health inspector but believes he passed all
the codes, he may still pay a bribe if he estimates that costs in the foregone revenue
from the restaurant being closed (until the case is sorted) is greater than paying the
inspector a bribe.
Add to this, one characteristic of many developing countries is the relatively low
wages of government employees the corruption problem potentially magnifies. Low
government wages have been suggested as a major cause of corruption and there has
been research suggesting that higher wages are associated with a reduction in perceived corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Svensson, 2005). The theory
suggests that low wages may encourage government workers to engage in corrupt
practices to supplement their income. In addition, low wages may provide the opportunity for a businessman to offer bribes in exchange for favors. Another example
common in many countries is when businessmen operate without a business license
and offer bribes when detected.
In order to bring together these different theoretical pieces of corruption, this
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study models a generic case of street level bureaucratic corruption in more detail and
explores potential strategies and decisions that each party (corrupt bureaucrat and
individual being extorted) could make.

6

Modeling Extortion
A typical scenario of street level corruption usually involves an interaction between

the corrupt agent and a member of the general public. It could be between an
individual importing goods and a customs officer, a restaurateur and a health code
inspector, or a police officer and a motorist at a traffic stop.
The interaction between the bureaucrat and individual is triggered when there
is the bureaucrat holds some form of leverage over the individual. If a businessman
importing products for his business is prohibited from bringing these items through
customs, this creates leverage for the custom officer, in that the officer knows the
businessman desires a resolution as soon as possible. The same applies to a motorist
commuting to work that is stopped by a corrupt officer. The officer knows that the
individual would be more susceptible to paying bribes if in a hurry. In both examples,
the individual may not be breaking any law but can still be harassed and intimidated,
or they may have broken laws and would rather bribe than deal with the punishment.
For example, if the businessman was attempting to import contraband items, the
customs officer on duty may try to convince the individual to pay an amount that is
low enough that bribing would be viewed as a better alternative than attempting to
dispute the legality of such imports. In other cases, even if items are trade permissible,
the corrupt customs officer may convince or at the very least, create doubt in the mind
of the individual that a violation was committed.
The individuals that find themselves as the target for corruption in these example
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scenarios have two main actions. They can decide to argue their case and take the
case to court or a higher authority or they can agree to pay the bureaucrat a bribe.
The response the individual makes is a function of whether he did anything wrong,
how valuable his time is (he may be in a rush to an engagement or not have the time
to go to court) and some personal characteristics such as how much justice means to
him or his tolerance for risk in general. For example, a business professional that has
an important meeting may be quick to pay the officer who tries to extort money from
him so that he can continue his commute, whereas the same business professional
coming back from a successful meeting may be willing to spend time arguing.
Demographic factors can also influence the strategies used by either actor. Dollar,
Fisman, and Gatti (2001) suggest that women are less likely to engage in corruption
because women are suggested to have higher morals than men. Thus, they may be
more resistant to extortion attempts. The effect of status may be play a role. For
example a high ranking government official may counter the threat of extortion by
wielding their influence. A common theme of this interaction is the information asymmetry for both parties. For example, assuming neither the bureaucrat nor individual
in question have interacted before, the bureaucrat would be unaware of the persons
financial status, whether he is secretly recording the interaction or if the person is
a high ranking government official; whereas the individual would be unaware of the
level of intimidation the bureaucrat is willing to use or the amount of bribe he is
going to demand. The literature on information asymmetry underscores the market
distortion impacts of these types of situations, along with the resulting inefficiencies
(Waterman and Meier, 1998).
The corrupt bureaucrat also has decisions to make. If the corrupt bureaucrat tries
to haggle for a better fee, it may raise suspicion and bring unwanted attention. In addition, some government organizations may have a quota for bribes that are required
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to be paid to organization superiors (Human Rights Watch, 2010), thus, if the quota
is off, the officer may want to charge more than they would normally. The location
and time of the day may also be important. For example in the case of the traffic stop,
if bribery attempt occurs in an area that is less traveled or late at night, the corrupt
bureaucrat will have a lower risk of being caught. In this situation the bureaucrat
also has higher bargaining power as they can take more aggressive actions if they
are not being observed. Like the private individual, time is a factor as well. Since
these corrupt bureaucrats are trying to maximize bribery earnings, they would rather
spend less time on individuals who are being ’difficult’ and move on to another target.
Another important consideration is the fact that even though many individuals do
not want to deal with courts and arguing with officers, some are willing to fight the
case. The frequency at which corrupt bureaucrats face punishment is compromised in
many cases because it is often the victims account against the bureaucrat’s account.
Thus, even though corrupt bureaucrats in highly corrupt countries may operate with
relatively low risk, there is still some risk involved and that is factored into each individuals decision making. In the end, these conflicting incentives and high degrees
of information asymmetry result in difficulties for predicting behavior and outcomes
across organizations and individuals.
Reports seem to suggest that many individuals in countries associated with high
levels corruption, when faced with corruption are likely to pay the bribe (Svensson,
2005). In addition, people view the payment of a bribe as a way to quickly deal with
the situation before it escalates (Human Rights Watch, 2010). However, even if one
decides to pay off the corrupt officer, there is still the issue of what amount will be
paid, as the amount to be paid is not fixed. Various factors influence the bribery
amount proposed. One factor is whether the individual in question committed any
infractions, and if they did, how big an offense was it. For example, someone driving
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without a license may be more willing to pay off a police officer, and also more willing
to pay a high bribe amount than someone who was driving a few miles over the speed
limit. As well, someone trying to smuggle contrabands across the border would be
willing to pay a relatively high amount to cross the border with these items.
Since neither the private individual nor the corrupt bureaucrat has even close to
perfect information about each others strategy, each party has to employ a rule of
thumb procedure to estimate how much to offer and accept in this extortion/negotiation
incidence. Sunstein and Thaler (2008) suggest that in instances where individuals
have to make quick decisions, they tend to rely on rules of thumbs, which are principles based on experiences or anecdotes, as opposed to theory or critical thinking. The
corrupt bureaucrats either from their experiences with previous extortion attempts
or from the experiences of colleagues, will arrive at a monetary range in which they
believe would be low enough for the target to pay without arguing, but high enough
to make the extortion attempt worth it. The individual may offer some resistance in
the same way people bargain in markets where there is no set price, but they eventually expect to arrive at some compromise. The individual either from experience
of being extorted, stories about the experiences of others, or just an educated guess,
will arrive at his own estimate of the minimum amount that the corrupt bureaucrat is
willing to accept. Just like the corrupt bureaucrat, the private individual will expect
some haggling over the fee but eventually a fee would be agreed upon.
Another important concept highlighted in the bargaining game is the concept of
anchoring. According Sunstein and Thaler (2008), anchoring refers to the reference
point(s) individuals use in decision making. As both parties haggle over prices, both
have set anchors. For the motorist the anchor is the sum where anything above
that amount is unacceptable; this is the willingness to pay amount. For the corrupt
bureaucrat, the anchor is the sum where anything below that amount is unacceptable.
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These anchors get adjusted with more information, but it still serves as a base for
the overall direction on how these individuals will make a decision. Thus, in this
bargaining game, both parties come in with anchor prices and then haggle for an
optimal fee. However, studies of corruption find there are often two anchors, a false
anchor and the true anchor. The false anchor is what the individual reveals, but
the true anchor is not revealed until the bargaining reaches an advanced point. For
example, this occurs in a store where there are no set prices and items are purchased
through bargaining between the seller and customer, like a garage sale. Suppose the
customer sees an item and is interested in purchasing it. However, the customer sets
the maximum price that she would pay for the item at $30, but comes in with an
initial offer for $20 and claims that she is not willing to go any higher. However, as
the seller and the buyer bargain, they eventually settle on a price of $26. This was
below the original anchor of $30, which is the figure the buyer was not willing to go
any higher on. Thus, $20 was the false anchor; the anchor used as a decoy for the
true anchor. Conversely, the seller plays the same strategy. The seller would not be
willing to sell the item for less than $25, but sets an asking price for $35. Thus, for
the seller $35 is the false anchor and $25 is the true anchor. Applied to the interaction
that takes place between a corrupt bureaucrat and an individual, the bureaucrat is
the seller in this scenario, and asks for a larger amount that what he would willingly
accept, while the individual being the target for extortion, may offer (or claim that
he has) less than he is willing to pay. Therefore the corrupt bureaucrat has a false
anchor that is higher than his true anchor and the private individual would have a
false anchor that is lower than the true anchor.
For most individuals, the rational decision is to simply pay the bribe and avoid
unnecessary hassle. The amount of the bribe is dynamic and changes depending on
the situation, but generally it satisfies two conditions. The first condition is that the
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amount the corrupt bureaucrat extorts is not so high that the individual in question
would consider disputing the allegations or take the case to court or to a higher
authority. The second condition is that the individual offers an amount that is not
too low such that the corrupt bureaucrat may decide to carry out more extreme
measures. In this case of corruption, these conditions are critical to determining an
“optimal” solution.
As Mantzavinos (2004) explained, social norms are maintained because of what
potential consequences when one deviates from the norm. Major forms of corruption
involving bureaucrats are such that if an individual shows resistance they are more
likely to achieve higher losses than if they just paid a bribe. If a businessman is denied
a license to operate and decides to fight his case of rightful ownership through the
courts, it may takes years and may not lead to the desired outcome. On the other
hand, if he pays the bribe to the bureaucrat responsible for issuing the permit, he
can enter the market and start operations quickly. In the case of corrupt officers, it
becomes a matter of paying a bribe or risking one’s safety and livelihood (Human
Rights Watch, 2010). The penalties for deviation acts as an informal reinforcement,
thus even if one feels strongly about corruption, the market dictates that individuals
engage in the very act that they denounce. In addition, there are instances where the
market also penalizes the corrupt bureaucrat for attempting to extort a larger than
optimal amount for the bribe. Attempting to collect more than the individual can
possibly give may result in more aggressive tactics. If the individual does not have
the funds, the extra aggressiveness would yield no additional financial gains but extra
costs due to wasted time and also increased unwanted attention which could increase
the risks of the bureaucrat being caught and punished.
The interaction between the corrupt bureaucrat and the individual can be modeled
algebraically with a game theoretic framework as a tool for explanation. This is
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illustrated in Figure 2 which models the interaction between a corrupt bureaucrat
and the individual in the form of a decision tree.
If the probability of being caught is p, and the amount extorted x, the expected
payoffs for the bureaucrat is therefore (1 − p)x. For the individual, the payoff is therefore the −(1 − p)x. If resistance occurs, the expected payoffs for both actors becomes
more nuanced. There becomes a cost in terms of lost time, in the equation, whereby t
represents the opportunity cost in terms of time and other costs the bureaucrat may
incur from facing resistance. The expected payoffs for the bureaucrat if he is able to
extort bribe becomes (1 − p)(xt) and if the individual agrees to pay the bribe, the
payoff for the individual is −(1 − p)(x + c), where c represents the costs incurred by
the individual for showing resistance. This cost for the individual comprises of time
costs and other costs as a result of coercive tactics employed by the bureaucrat. If the
individual successfully resists extortion, the expected payoff is (1 − p)(r − c), where r
refers to the integrity one gains by standing up to corruption. If the corrupt official
decides not to extort after debating with the individual, the payoff is (1 − p)(−t)
which is a net loss.

88

Figure.2: Decision tree showing the expected payoffs between a bureaucrat and the
victim of extortion

The red fonts in italics indicate actions by the bureaucrat, while the blue fonts in italics
indicate actions by the victim of extortion. The numbers at the end of each decision
tree represents the expected payoffs of both the bureaucrat and the victim, with the top
representing the bureaucrat’s payoff and the bottom indicating the victim’s payoff.
To gain further insight into bureaucratic corruption, exploring a realistic scenario
in which this form of corruption takes place will be briefly discussed. Let the scenario
be that of a corrupt police officer and a motorist, in which the motorist is stopped
and not allowed to leave until a bribe is paid. The perceived probability is based on
experience and information received from other colleagues. If the colleagues of the
corrupt officer tend not to be caught or punished for engaging in corrupt acts, the
officer would estimate the probability of being caught to be low. On the other hand,
if recent officials have been caught or punished, the officer would adjust his priors and
perceived an increased probability of being caught. However, the perception is also
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influenced by the risk tolerance of the individual. A riskier individual may estimate
the probability to be lower than it actually is while a risk averse bureaucrat would
be less willing to engage in corruption.
From a policy perspective, if the goal is to deter bureaucrats from engaging in
corrupt behavior, then increasing probability of being caught p becomes paramount.
In many societies the punishment for corruption involves fines and jail times, even
for lower levels of corruption. The idea is that by imposing severe punishments, it
would deter individuals from engaging in corruption. However, corruption among
bureaucrats in some countries continue to be high despite the potential punishment.
This suggests that the perceived probability of being caught would have to be considerable low that the extortion attempt is worth the risk. For example, if there is a
jail time of 5 years and a fine of $5000 for a street level bureaucrat to engage in corruption, extorting a bribe of $50 would mean that the perceived probability of being
caught would have to be at most 0.01 for a rational street level bureaucrat to engage
in corruption. This number may seem very low but the predominance of corruption
involving relatively small sums of money, suggests that probability of being caught
especially for small scale corruption approaches zero. Thus, if the corrupt police officer extorts a bribe of $50 and there is no resistance, the expected payoff is close to 50
as the probability of being caught is close to zero which makes the expected payoff
(1 − p)$50 close to $50.
The bribery amount set by corrupt officer may be arbitrary or may be based on
the information of other colleagues or from previous experiences. In this scenario,
the corrupt officer sets an amount he perceives the motorist would be able to pay as
opposed to trying to show resistance.
The victim of the extortion attempt will also perceive the chances of the officer
being caught as close to zero because of previous encounters or encounters of other
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people. The low perceived probability also suggests increased fear that the officer ay
take severe actions if the bribe is not paid as soon as possible, making them more
likely to pay the bribe.
By viewing corruption through the lenses of organization behavior, social norms,
and game theory, it becomes apparent that corruption is a complex issue for organizations and governments to tackle. From an organizational standpoint, issues
around employing recruitment and delegation of duties helps to maintain a culture
and practice of corruption. In terms of social norms, the experiences of individuals
with corrupt bureaucrats in the past in many cases has led to the creation of social
norms, whereby paying bribes is the rational action for individuals to pursue. And
finally, modeling the interaction between the bureaucrat and a target of extortion
helps explain some of the factors both parties consider when deciding whether or not
to engage in corruption.

7

Policy Discussion and Conclusions
From a policy perspective the idea that people pay bribes because it is the rational,

least cost alternative is not ideal, both from a moral perspective as well as an economic
standpoint. This situation is synonymous to robbery in the sense that funds are
illegally obtained from individuals, and these resources could have been spent on
necessities, consumer goods, investment opportunities, education and other areas
that could improve the economic outcomes of an individual, as well as a community
and nation.
Many countries have laws against corruption and extortion but some countries are
better at enforcing these laws than others. If the judicial system is understaffed or ill
equipped to deal with the plights of citizens in a society, then citizens lose confidence
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in the formal institutions and have to look for alternative solutions. Likewise if street
level and other bureaucrats are underpaid relative to average wages across society,
corrupt behavior may be more likely. In these situations, corruption is grudgingly
accepted as a way of life and it appears to be a very difficult and intractable problem
to solve.
In looking for solutions to the problem, one can look at the composition of the
staff in these agencies and it has been argued that there is need to recruit better
and more passionate bureaucrats, with higher integrity. However, if the wages are
not perceived as competitive and fair then individuals with these qualities may look
for other occupations. If the wages are not addressed then people that may have
been very qualified for the job may consider other options. Additionally, even if these
individuals can recruited with respectable wages, the culture may remain a hindrance
individuals behaving with less corruption. In these cases, this may lead to a situation
where people who want to be bureaucrats for dishonest reasons will have a higher
chance of gaining employment as the recruiting pool is diminished.
Corruption among bureaucrats may be further facilitated through a lack of protection afforded to citizens. That is, if citizens feel helpless or defenseless against
bribery or extortion efforts, then corruption in these societies is likely to occur at
high frequency. In order to reduce police corruption, empowering citizens is necessary. Empowerment entails encouraging citizens to speak up and assuring that they
will be protected. Protection of citizens from corruption is an area that many administrations in developing countries has not been effective in achieving. Even where
there are protections, poverty, limited professional lawyers or legal assistance, and
other challenges may prevent individuals from being able to pursue an injustice in
the court system. Many individuals may also simply lack confidence in the judiciary
system.
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Protection of individuals should also involve increased accountability on the part of
bureaucrats. Stronger accountability has been associated with lower rates of corruption (Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Lederman, Loayza, and Soares, 2005)and is theorized to
serve as a deterrent to corruption. More and stronger accountability increases monitoring and therefore a higher probability or perceived probability of being caught for
engaging in corrupt behavior.
Theories of organization culture suggest that changing organizational culture is a
difficult task because even with a complete overhaul, corruption is likely to manifest
itself when like minded individuals are within the same organization. Thus, addressing the recruiting procedure for public servants is critical. A more transparent process
based on merits, ability and motivation should be the goal, whereby people recruited
are more likely to have high dishonesty costs or low tolerance for corruption. Additionally, a focus on rewarding merit and ethical behavior may be an additional tool
for recruitment and stability of less corrupt employees.
The aim of this study was to explore the phenomenon behind the prevalence of
corruption in some public agencies. Theories of organizational culture suggest the
role of leadership and learning within the organization facilitate corruption due to
the nature of the interaction between senior bureaucrats and new recruits. However,
the organization is also influenced by the external environment, in that the external
environment does not offer meaningful resistance to corruption. The combination of
a defenseless public and a strong culture of corruption has resulted in an ongoing
struggle with corruption among street level bureaucrats. In the end, a multi-pronged
approach that increases surveillance and monitoring of bureaucrats; addresses wages,
the recruiting process and organizational structure and finally the culture of corruption; will be needed to reduce corruption within government agencies and across
street-level bureaucrats around the world.
93

References
Alemika, E. E. (1988). Policing and perceptions of police in nigeria. Police Stud.:
Int’l Rev. Police Dev. 11, 161.
Cook, S. D. and D. Yanow (1993). Culture and organizational learning. Journal of
management inquiry 2 (4), 373–390.
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Conclusion

The essays shed light on the current state of corruption research. The first and
third essays highlight the importance of monitoring and accountability for the practice
and effectiveness of corruption. Before an individual engages in corrupt behavior
they pay attention to the risks and potential benefits and costs from engaging in
corrupt behavior. The risk component consists of the probability and consequences
of being caught. From a policy perspective, this suggests that anti-corruption effects
should focus on increasing monitoring efforts and imposing adequate punishments for
corruption in order to deter corrupt behavior.
In the first study it was found that increased internet awareness on corruption, a
relatively free press and higher quality of institutions are associated with lower levels
of corruption. In the second study, it was found that people who feel marginalized
and are unhappy with the political administration are more likely to perceive high
rates of corruption than people who feel less marginalized and optimistic about the
political administration. In the final study, a framework of street level corruption was
developed with the suggestion that there is a culture of acceptance of corruption in
many countries riddled with corruption. The study also gave potential reasons for
why there is little resistance to corruption and suggested potential ways of addressing
the issue of resistance.
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One of the issues affecting the ability of the state to monitor corruption is that the
anti-corruption agencies themselves may be riddled with corruption, therefore anticorruption strategies could lead to more corruption and more losses to the overall
economy if the institutions are weak (Olken and Pande, 2012). Despite this, there
is promise that effective monitoring can reduce corruption because of its impacts
on increasing the risks of being caught. In a randomized field experiment, Olken
(2007) found that an increase in the frequency of audits helped reduce the amount of
unaccounted expenditures in a road project in Indonesia. This suggests that audits
which is a form of monitoring, help increase the probability of getting caught, which
in turn reduces incentives to engage in corrupt behavior.
Closely related to monitoring is transparency. Transparency can occur in different
ways and depends on the sector as to what the demands for transparency may look
like. One core area of transparency is a robust freedom of press. Freedom of press
has been suggested in this study, as well as in the corruption literature (Brunetti and
Weder, 2003) as a critical component to fighting corruption. The ability of the media
to disclose cases of corruption or cases of unaccounted funds in the budget is critical.
Reinikka and Svensson (2005) suggests a reduction in unaccounted funds in an education program in Uganda due to a widespread newspaper campaign. The authors
also show an increase in school enrollment due to the reduction in stolen funds. The
ability of the formal institutions to impose credible policies to improve accountability,
transparency, and related enforcement strategies are critical to deterring corruption.
If the current research shows promise for monitoring and transparency as anticorruption tools, how can governments promote transparency? The answer may lie
with the quality and commitment of institutions. Svensson (2005) suggests that Singapore and Hong Kong were able to experience a significant reduction in corruption
in part due to the commitment of the government. In theory, credible commitments
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to policy objectives should have an effect on policy implementation, while a lack
of commitment may result in ineffective policies. In communities with widespread
corruption, anti-corruption polices can be undermined on purpose because the administration benefits from corruption. Therefore, there might be an incentive for a
corrupt administration to restrict free media and derail transparency efforts. A potential for optimism may be that some international aid agencies have set up incentive
schemes whereby aid is given to low income countries based on reductions in levels of
corruption (Olken and Pande, 2012). Another area in which transparency can potentially be improved is through improvements in infrastructure such as internet access
and electricity which allows individuals more opportunities to access information.
The second study suggests some potential issues of survey based measures of
corruption. A case can be made that survey based measures of corruption are more
suited for cross country analysis than within country studies. The suggestion is based
on the idea that national measures of corruption take into account the averages of
the country as well as input from international expatriates, whereas using a state
measure magnifies the ethnic and tribal differences between tribes which make the
results more prone to bias. In addition, various experiments (Fisman and Miguel,
2007; Barr and Serra, 2010) suggests correlation between corrupt behavior and the
country’s rankings according to survey based measures of corruption. Such studies
can be replicated on the state level to observe state or tribal differences in corrupt
behavior. As such, future research may entail experiments that simulate scenarios
to test for the presence of nepotism or tribalism in making decisions. The research
also suggests that political strategies can be used to distract the general public about
issues of corruption and that the public’s moods affect their perceptions of corruption.
Future research can focus on the use of symbolic polices or policies aimed at appealing
to the beliefs of the constituents without having any tangible effect (Anderson, 2014),
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in order to sway approval ratings for the incumbent administration.
Another theme in this research is the empowerment of citizens to speak out against
corruption and share their experiences with regard to corruption. However, in many
countries citizens are unable to speak out or resist corruption attempts due to the lack
of protection and institutional constraints. There is therefore a need for government
administrations to protect citizens, along with the media and to protect the rights of
individuals in seeking justice for corrupt bureaucratic behavior.
An argument can be made that corruption need not be the focus for policymakers
because some countries such as China have been able to achieve rapid economic growth
even with relatively high corruption. Li and Wu (2010) suggest that in countries
characterized by having relatively low levels of trust, the major forms of corruption
tend to be predatory in nature, whereas in countries with relatively high levels of trust,
major forms of corruption are efficiency-enhancing. Predatory corruption signifies
corruption that is more harmful to the economy, usually in areas such as embezzlement
and money laundering of government funds. While, efficiency enhancing corruption
focuses more on corruption such as bribing to acquire permits, where the aim to
enhance productivity and economic activity (Li and Wu, 2010). The idea is that
while both categories of corruption create costs, predatory corruption is deemed more
harmful to development goals than the others (Li and Wu, 2010) and this may have
policy implications regarding the amount and targeting of government resources to
deter or reduce corruption as opposed to the pursuit of other economic and human
development policies. However, the distribution effects of corruption may affect how
important corruption is as a policy issue, in that if it is believed that corruption affects
the poor more than the rich and therefore results in a higher disparity in terms of
income and opportunities, then addressing corruption may be of high priority for
policymakers if reducing disparity is part of their objectives.
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In summary, this research has shown that corruption manifests itself in a variety
of forms, and the causes of corruption vary from country to country and from organization to organization. This suggests that no single approach can be applied to
eradicating corruption. What has been understood however, is that good governance
and transparency efforts should help in fighting corruption because they help deter
corruption. However, institutions themselves can be riddled with corruption which in
turn affects anti-corruption efforts. Thus, research on improving institutions becomes
critical. In addition, some of the research on corruption suggests that the impact of
tensions within and between groups around issues of nepotism is a significant area
of contention. Further research on the impact of this type of corruption specifically
should be an objective, as well as ways of improving cooperation and trust between
groups.
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